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Summary 
In June 2013, the Commission proposed that the scope of merger control in 
the EU should be extended to include non-controlling minority shareholding 
acquisitions. The purpose of this thesis is to assess whether the proposed 
legal reform is motivated from a legal perspective. 
 
There is proof that non-controlling minority shareholdings may have 
significant anti-competitive effects. Indeed, such acquisitions could be 
incompatible with the common market and merit prohibition under the 
current merger regulation. However, the current scope is limited to 
controlling acquisitions. The purpose of the merger regulation to maintain 
effective competition motivates the conclusion that there is a regulatory gap.  
 
However, the gap in the law is narrow. First, there are some instances where 
non-controlling minority shareholdings can be assessed under the current 
merger regulation. Second, articles 101 and 102 in the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union are applicable in some circumstances. 
Finally, the number of problematic non-controlling minority shareholding 
acquisitions is likely very small.  
 
The merger control process system is demanding in that the acquirer have to 
submit a mandatory notification attached with detailed information. 
Moreover, the transactions cannot be implemented until the Commission 
has cleared them. The Commission considers using an alternative process 
system for non-controlling minority shareholding acquisitions. One of these 
options does not require ex-ante control as the current system does. Instead, 
the Commission would assess market compatibility after the transaction is 
implemented. However, it cannot be proven that alternative systems would 
be sufficiently effective in this thesis. Furthermore, negative aspects of the 
control systems might not make legal reform proportionate.   
 
It is uncertain how the reform should be implemented to remedy the 
regulatory gap. Concerns with the control system is only one of the 
concerns. There is also not enough legal evidence to establish what non-
controlling minority shareholdings would merit scrutiny. Considering the 
concerns for implementation and that the regulatory gap is very narrow, it is 
not proven that the proposed legal reform is motivated from a legal 
perspective.  
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Sammanfattning 
I juni förra året föreslog Europeiska kommissionen att tillämpningen av 
Koncentrationsförordningen skulle utvidgas till att omfatta icke-
kontrollerande minoritetsförvärv. Syftet med den här uppsatsen är att 
bedöma huruvida den föreslagna reformen är motiverad från ett rättsligt 
perspektiv. 
 
Det finns belägg för att icke-kontrollerande minoritetsförvärv kan ha 
väsentliga negativa effekter för konkurrensen. Sådana förvärv skulle kunna 
vara oförenliga med den gemensamma marknaden och därmed kunna 
förbjudas enligt Koncentrationsförordningen. Emellertid gör begräsningarna 
i tillämpligheten av förordningen att alla sådana förvärv inte kontrolleras. 
Koncentrationsförordningens syfte att upprätthålla effektiv konkurrens 
motiverar slutsatsen att det finns en lucka i lagen.  
 
Bristerna i lagen är däremot små. Till att börja med finns det möjligheter att 
utreda vissa icke-kontrollerande minoritetsförvärv enligt 
koncentrationsförordningen. Vidare är artikel 101 och artikel 102 i 
Funktionsfördraget tillämpliga under vissa omständigheter. Slutligen är 
troligen ett mycket litet antal icke-kontrollerande minoritetsförvärv 
problematiska. 
 
Det gällande kontrollprocessen är mycket krävande genom att förvärvaren 
måste skicka ett meddelande om det tänkta förvärvet till kommissionen med 
omfattande information. Förvärvet får inte fullbordas innan kommissionen 
godkänner förvärvet. I samband med förslaget att utvidga tillämpningen av 
Koncentrationsförordningen föreslog även kommission alternativ till den 
gällande kontrollprocessen. Ett av dessa förslag är att meddelandeplikten 
skulle avskaffas för icke-kontrollerande minoritetsförvärv och att 
kommissionen skulle få utreda transaktionerna i efterhand istället. 
Emellertid har inte utredningen i denna uppsats kunnat bevisa att alternativa 
system kan vara tillräckligt effektiva. Vidare skulle negativa effekter av 
kontrollprocessen kunna göra en reform oproportionerlig.  
 
Det är oklart hur reformen skulle implementeras för att läka bristerna i 
gällande rätt. Eventuella problem relaterade till kontrollprocessen är inte 
den enda orsaken till oklarheterna. Det finns inte tillräckligt med bevis för 
att kunna fastslå exakt vilka typer och icke-kontrollerande minoritetsförvärv 
som borde kontrolleras enligt Koncentrationsförordningen. Med anledning 
av att det finns oklarheter och att bristerna i gällande rätt troligen är mycket 
små så är det inte visat att reform är motiverad från ett rättsligt perspektiv. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
 
Mergers and acquisitions may have a number of purposes, such as being 
investments that can yield future profits. Undoubtedly, these investments 
may contribute to economic growth. However, mergers and acquisitions can 
cause changes to market structures if the target firm is a competitor. As a 
result, the acquirer may become less dependent on competitors, causing 
decreased effective competition in the concerned market. Consequently, 
there is a need to regulate transactions involving mergers and acquisitions of 
competing undertakings. The regulative process is provided by competition 
law and is commonly referred to as merger control.  
 
This thesis concerns the application of merger control in the EU with regard 
to recent proposals by the Commission to reform the current merger control 
regime. In June 2013, the Commission published a Working Staff 
Document, Towards More Effective Merger Control (the Consultation 
Document). Most notably, it proposes that the application of the EUMR 
should be expanded to include structural links. The concept refers to non-
controlling minority shareholdings, although the Commission concedes that 
not all non-controlling minority shareholdings should necessarily qualify as 
structural links.1 In other words, the Commission did not specify the exact 
extent of the proposed reform. As will be explained in [2.4], there is 
currently a requirement for transfer of control over an undertaking for a 
transaction to be subject to merger control according to the EUMR. 
Therefore, application of the EUMR is currently limited. The Commission 
argues that some minority shareholdings may be harmful to competition 
despite lack of control and refers to economic theory to support the claims 
inter alia.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Consultation Document, p 8. 
 8 
 
1.2 Purpose 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to assess if the proposal by the Commission to 
extend the scope of EUMR to structural links is motivated from a legal 
perspective. One important task is to investigate whether there may be a gap 
in the law that the Commission’s proposed legal reform would remedy. 
Thus, the study requires the examination of the current content and purposes 
of the EUMR and the effects of non-controlling minority shareholdings. In 
order to assess if legal reform is proportionate it is also important to 
consider issues concerning the merger control legal process system. 
 
The following research questions are discussed for the purpose of the thesis: 
 
1. Should non-controlling minority shareholding acquisitions be 
subject to EU merger control considering the purpose of EUMR to 
protect competition and the effects of the acquisitions? 
2. To what extent is current law insufficient for merger control of non-
controlling minority shareholdings? 
3. Could issues with the legal procedure of merger control discourage 
reform? 
 
 
 
1.3 Method 
 
The primary research method used in this thesis is the legal dogmatic 
method. Dogmatism means that conclusions are inferred from widely 
accepted principles. The legal dogmatic method requires the study of legal 
sources. The law itself is the highest authority and is a legal source that has 
to be regarded. Legal practice is secondary, since it provides interpretation 
of the law in the implementation in practice. Legal practice should be 
regarded, and judgements of courts higher in the court hierarchy have more 
authority than lesser courts or public agencies.2 Commentary in legal 
doctrine and other material may be regarded as legal sources but have less 
authority.3 The legal sources used in this thesis and their source authority 
are discussed below in [1.4].  
 
The legal dogmatic method may be used to prove what the law is, and 
contribute to discussions of what it should be.4 Consequently, the meanings 
and purposes of law are investigated from the inside out by interpreting 
                                                 
2 Peczenik, p 35. 
3 Ibid, p 42‒43. 
4 Lehrberg, p 167. 
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legal sources.5 The rest of this section explains my approach to answering 
each of the research questions. 
  
Answering the first research question requires studying the meaning of 
current law. I examine the meaning of non-controlling minority 
shareholdings with reference to the notion control in EUMR. To determine 
the level of competition that the EUMR purposes to protect, I investigate the 
conditions for prohibition, the Recitals in the ingress of the law, contents of 
the TFEU and interpretations in legal doctrine. The anti-competitive effects 
of non-controlling minority shareholdings are examined by investigating 
assessments in legal practice and the Commission’s economic study.  
 
Assuming that extending the scope of merger control to structural links is 
consistent with the purposes and contents of EUMR, it remains to be proven 
that the reform would make a difference in practice. For if very few non-
controlling minority shareholdings would cause problems for competition, 
reform would perhaps not be needed. I believe that analysing statistics could 
provide indications of the amount of problematic structural links. Thereby, 
the magnitude of any problem could be identified. Relevant statistics is the 
number of minority shareholdings that have not been scrutinised for being 
non-controlling but concern high turnover businesses in related markets 
within the EU.6 Furthermore, the Commission’s economic study compares 
the magnitude of anti-competitive effects of structural links the effects of 
controlling acquisitions. Thus, statistics of the current portion of merger 
cases that lead to prohibitions can be used to predict if a larger or smaller 
portion of the total number of structural links could be prohibited. 
 
Comparisons with law and legal practice in other jurisdictions may reveal 
similarities and differences between the studied legal systems.7 I examine 
jurisdictions that currently apply merger control to structural links. The 
comparative method can be used to prove that solutions in other legal 
systems work well and are motivated by empiricism.8 The comparative 
method is used in this thesis to help prove or disprove that merger control of 
structural links can be effective in practice, thereby contributing to the 
assessment concerning the need for reform and proportionality. The 
comparative study may also provide inspiration as to what non-controlling 
minority shareholdings should qualify as structural links and be subject to 
EU merger control.  
 
The second research question regards the uses of current law for the 
Commission to control non-controlling minority shareholdings. Any pre-
existing possibilities to control non-controlling minority shareholdings 
might motivate a less comprehensive reform. Otherwise, the reform would 
                                                 
5 Vranken, p 112. 
6 Consultation Document, paras 92-93; also see [1.4] about what statistics are studied. 
7 Bogdan, p 18. 
8 Ibid, p 27. 
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arguably be unnecessary and excessive. On the other hand, if the 
possibilities derive from other legal provisions than the EUMR, one may 
argue that there is a risk for ambiguity or lack of palpability. The latter 
argument could motivate extending the scope of the EUMR for practical 
reasons. I use the legal dogmatic method for answering the second research 
question. The study concerns both the uses of EUMR and other provisions 
in EU law, more specifically articles 101 and 102 TFEU.  
 
With the third research question, I consider issues related to the system of 
control. With system of control, I mean what tools the Commission is 
provided with by law to identify and prohibit transactions that may harm 
effective competition in markets. The Commission considers alternative 
options as to the system of control in the Consultation Document.9 It is 
assumed that the system of merger control needs to be effective to allow any 
remedying effect of extending the scope of merger control. The legal 
dogmatic method is used primarily to examine the current system of control. 
Negative aspects of the alternative control systems are discussed with 
reference to organisations that have replied to the Consultation document. If 
reform could have negative aspects, then the reform may be discouraged.  
 
 
 
1.4 Material 
 
As implied in the previous section [1.3], the study concerns current law to a 
great extent. The EUMR and TFEU are particularly important for the study 
since they are primary sources of law for competition law and merger 
control in the EU. The TEU and TFEU are the most authoritative sources of 
law in the EU since they establish the EU as a legal body and independent 
jurisdiction.10 EUMR is a Council Regulation. Regulations are directly 
applicable for all Member States in the Union according to article 288 
TFEU. It is the Commission’s duty to investigate and decide on 
infringements of competition law.11 Likewise, the Commission is 
responsible for merger control under the EUMR.12 Decisions by the 
Commissions are legally binding according to article 288 TFEU. 
Consequently, Commission decisions relating to mergers and acquisitions 
provide legal evidence for how merger control law is implemented in 
practice. Therefore, Commission decisions are very important materials. 
                                                 
9 See [2.1]. 
10 See article 1 TEU and article 1 TFEU establishing the EU and providing the authority of 
the EU. See also article 13 TEU that declares the European institutions as subordinate 
entities to act in conformity with the treaties and within the powers conferred to them by 
the treaties.  
11 See article 17 TEU providing the general duties of the Commission article 105 TFEU 
providing the authority for competition control more specifically. 
12 See for example articles 2, 6 and 8 EUMR. 
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Cases from the Courts of the European Union, the General Court and the 
CJEU are also important. The Courts’ controlling function enables review of 
Commission decisions that may result in that the Commission’s decisions 
are overruled.13 Court cases may thus also provide legal evidence as to the 
implementation of merger control law in practice.  
 
Several Commission documents are studied. The most significant is the 
Consultation Document since it is the publication of the Commission’s 
proposal for an extended scope of EUMR and the object of analysis. There 
are two annexes to the document. Annex I presents economic theory that 
supports the claim that non-controlling minority shareholdings may 
negatively affect effective competition. It is the only material I use to 
explain anti-competitive effects of non-controlling minority shareholdings 
according to economic theory. Annex II contains review of relevant 
Commission legal practice among other investigations. The Consultation 
Document with its annexes thus contributes to investigations relating to all 
research questions. Other Commission documents are studied as well. For 
example, the Concentration Notice contributes to ascertaining the meaning 
of non-controlling minority shareholdings since it provides conclusions 
from legal practice related to the EUMR. The Green Paper can also be 
mentioned as an example. It presents a review by the Commission about 
past control of non-controlling minority shareholdings. Generally, 
Commission documents are tools that may help explain current law and 
review legal practice. However, they are not authoritative sources of law.14 
 
Legal doctrine on EU merger control law supplement the treaties, 
Commission decisions and Commission documents to explain and interpret 
current law.15 However, legal doctrine is no authoritative source of law in 
that legal doctrine is only concerned with explaining and interpreting more 
authoritative sources. Nonetheless, legal doctrine may provide more 
elaborate explanation and legal arguments.16 Unfortunately, legal arguments 
regarding the need to apply merger control to structural links have not been 
found in legal doctrine. Instead, legal doctrine is used more for explanation 
in this thesis. For example, Cook and Kerse is studied for discursive 
accounts on the uses of the current EUMR. Whish is studied for similar 
purposes. On the other hand, Bishop and Walker contribute to more 
economic perspectives and the purposes of EU competition law.  
 
There is little guidance in legal sources on the suitability of the proposed 
legal change. On the other hand, there is criticism in the consultation replies. 
I recognise that the source authority of the consultation replies may be 
limited. Moreover, bias may have influenced the comments more or less 
                                                 
13 See article 19 TEU about the controlling function of the Courts and the authority to 
interpret EU law.  
14 It is evident from article 288 TFEU that only regulations, directives and decisions are 
legally binding.  
15 Peczenik, p 42‒43. 
16 Vranken, p 111. 
 12 
 
significantly. For example, law firms may reflect interests from their clients 
in the business community for good or for bad. NCAs may be restricted by 
reflecting the view in domestic law. The Consultation replies would hardly 
qualify as reflecting legal doctrine since the authors in legal doctrine gain 
authority as a legal source from legal research and formulating principles 
that become widely accepted.17 Thus, the replies are not significantly 
influential for my conclusions. Only a selection of the replies are presented 
to provide overview. Replies from several different types of organisations 
have been selected, including NCAs, law firms and lawyers associations. 
The replies from law firms have been selected randomly. Replies from the 
NCAs of Germany and the UK have been chosen since German and UK law 
is studied to some extent in the thesis. The reply from ICC has been chosen 
since it reflects views by representatives of the business community. 
Finally, the lawyer’s associations ECLF and IBA have been selected since 
they reflect views by independent lawyers in Europe and worldwide 
respectively. 
 
Statistics in the Zephyr database are studied for the statistical study of the 
amount of non-controlling minority shareholdings that have been outside the 
scope of the EUMR but concern high turnover businesses in related markets 
within the EU. The study refers to conclusions of the data made by the 
Commission and presented in Annex II to the Consultation Document. The 
statistics regarding the portion of transactions currently within the scope that 
infringe the EUMR are provided by merger statistics found on the 
Commission website. 
 
The comparative study concerns law in Germany and the UK. For example 
the Enterprise Act (2002) in the UK is relevant material. A few examples 
from legal practice in the UK and Germany are also used. The statistics on 
number of scrutinised non-controlling minority shareholdings are provided 
by the Commission in Annex II to the Consultation Document. 
 
There is limited availability of material for the study presented in this thesis. 
After all, it concerns a very recent proposal for changing the law. Some 
sections may only refer to one or two sources. The limited amount of 
material makes it impossible to stick to the legal dogmatic method and 
compare views in legal doctrine. Proof has to found by using additional 
means. The lack of sources in legal doctrine is also why I choose to study 
the consultation replies for any criticism on the commission’s proposals that 
can be discussed in the analysis.  
 
 
 
                                                 
17 Peczenik, p 42-43. 
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1.5 Delimitations 
 
Since this thesis is written at advanced level, elementary EU law cannot be 
elaborated more than what is necessary for the background to the study and 
relevant for the analysis. It is presumed that the reader is familiar with 
basics in EU competition law, merger control and merger control procedure. 
Most importantly, the principle for proportionality in EU law cannot be 
described within the boundaries of the thesis. It is presumed that the reader 
is familiar with this basic principle. 
 
However, the contents of EU competition law that relate to Commission’s 
proposal will be explained. For example, the concept undertaking is a 
concept in the current EUMR that will be explained. The concept relates to 
the scope of the EUMR and the meaning of controlling influence, but an in-
depth investigation is not required since the proposal to extend the scope of 
EUMR does not affect how an undertaking is defined. A similar motivation 
applies for limited descriptions of other discussed features of the current 
EUMR.  
 
Economic aspects are especially relevant to consider in the thesis for 
assessing the effects on competition by non-controlling minority 
shareholdings. The Commission has made such a study, and it is published 
in Annex I, as is also mentioned in section [1.4]. However, Commission’s 
study economic study will not be challenged. I do not possess the 
qualifications to provide in-depth analysis in economics as opposed to legal 
research. As a result, I will accept the contents of the Commission’s 
economic study as fact.  
 
One part of this contribution regards perspectives about the control of non-
controlling minority shareholdings in other legal systems than the EU. The 
purpose is to identify the main features only. An in-depth study may be 
relevant to make. However, it is not possible to make such a comprehensive 
study within the boundaries of this contribution. 
 
In the Consultation Document, the Commission also considers other 
changes to the EUMR than extending to scope of merger control to include 
structural links. Primarily, the other proposals concern the case referral 
system between the Commission and Member States. However, I have 
chosen not to investigate these proposals since the propositions about the 
referral system are independent of the propositions regarding structural 
links. In other words, the issues regarding changes to the referral system are 
not so closely related to the issues regarding extending the scope to 
structural links that the main purpose of the thesis motivates an investigation 
of the reform proposals regarding the referral system.  
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1.6 Outline 
 
To begin with, the proposal by the Commission to extend the scope of 
merger control is described. In addition, some notes on the concept 
structural links is presented to provide background for the continued 
investigation. In the same chapter, I present relevant contents and purposes 
of the current EUMR. First, the current application of the EUMR is 
described and thereby also the meaning of non-controlling minority 
shareholdings. 
 
The last sections in chapter [2] describe the substantial criteria in the EUMR 
for prohibiting acquisitions. The purposes of the EUMR are closely linked 
with the assessment. Therefore, the level of competition that the EUMR 
purposes to maintain is examined at this point as well.  
 
In the following chapter [3], I investigate anti-competitive effects by non-
controlling minority shareholdings. The chapter begins with the 
Commission’s economic investigation. Then, experiences from EU legal 
practice are examined. Moving on, I present the statistical investigation of 
the Zephyr database. More statistics are presented in the following section 
[3.4], which contains the comparative study of German and UK law. The 
chapter ends with a short discussion regarding the need to extend the scope 
of merger control with reference to Consultation replies.  
 
Chapter [4] contains the investigation on the uses of current law for 
regulating non-controlling minority shareholdings. First, the limitations of 
EUMR are discussed. The investigation illustrates the limitations with 
examples from legal practice. In the following section [4.2], I consider 
whether the EUMR is used exclusively for merger and acquisitions, and if 
so why. Then I move on to discuss the possibility to apply articles 101 and 
102 TFEU to non-controlling minority shareholding acquisitions.  
 
Chapter [5] regards issues related what system of control to apply for 
structural links in case of reform. The chapter begins with an investigation 
of the current notification system in the EUMR. The merger statistics are 
also presented in the first section. Moving on, alternative systems as 
proposed by the Commission are presented in [5.2]. Finally, the issues and 
benefits with the alternative options are discussed with reference to 
Consultation replies.  
 
All research questions are answered in order in the analysis in chapter [6]. 
Finally, in [6.4] I provide concluding remarks on whether the proposed 
reform is motivated from a legal perspective.  
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2. Structural Links and Current 
Purpose and Application of the 
Merger Regulation 
2.1 The Commission’s Proposal and 
General Notes on the Concept 
Structural Links 
 
This section summarises the proposal by the Commission presented in the 
Consultation document to extend the scope of merger control to structural 
links. Thus, it provides background for the continued study. Many of the 
concepts and terms that are used in the Consultation Document relate to 
contents of current merger control law. Explanations are provided in 
subsequent sections of the chapter.  
 
The consultation document is not a law proposal in the sense that it is not 
directed to the Council for decision, but to third parties for analysis and 
comment.18 Consequently, the Consultation Document is discursive and 
inquiring. One of the objectives of the Consultation Document is to make 
proposals and seek comments on the following issue:19 
 
- Whether to apply merger control rules to deal with the anti-competitive effects stemming 
from certain acquisitions of non-controlling minority shareholdings; 
 
The background of the Commission’s proposals regarding structural links is 
that the Commission believes that some non-controlling minority 
shareholding acquisitions may have anti-competitive effects, and that the 
Commission is currently not able to control such acquisitions according to 
current law. In other words, the Commission believes that the law does not 
provide sufficient tools to allow control of certain transactions that may 
harm effective competition. To support the claim that non-controlling 
minority shareholdings may harm effective competition, the Commission 
refers to economic theory, its own practice and the practice in Member 
States. Referrals to these issues are discussed in subsequent chapters.  
 
It must be emphasized that the Commission does not make any proposal as 
to specifically what non-controlling minority shareholdings should qualify 
as structural links and thus be subject to the application of the EUMR.20 In 
                                                 
18 The Consultation Document, p 1. 
19 Ibid, p 3.  
20 Ibid, p 7. 
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other words, the exact extent of any proposed reform is not given. However, 
the Commission identifies two alternative methods. The first is to simply 
put a fixed percentage threshold for what size of a non-controlling minority 
shareholding that should be considered structural links in the reformed 
EUMR. The other option would be to use other substantive criteria 
instead.21 
 
Now, some background as to the concept structural links can be found in 
EU law. The concept links is often used in EU competition law to imply that 
anti-competitive relationships exist between undertakings. The test for the 
existence of links in EU competition law is currently made in investigations 
concerning both cartels under article 101 TFEU and collective dominance 
under article 102 TFEU.22 Three types of links have been distinguished in 
EU law. Economic links is used to describe economic interdependence 
between undertakings in a market. Economic links do not require any 
agreement or other legal relationship. Instead, economic links exist where 
the behaviour of the competing undertakings is adapted to the competitors, 
as opposed to challenging the competitor.23 On the other hand, commercial 
links require the existence of an agreement, which for example may involve 
cross-licensing. Finally, structural links involves cross-directorship between 
undertakings, such as cross-shareholdings, participation in joint ventures, or 
participation in trade associations.24 In the context of tests for collective 
dominance under article 102 TFEU, the concept structural links have been 
used to describe the ability to influence the commercial conduct in the 
competing undertaking resulting from one of the relationships listed in the 
previous sentence.25 Consequently, I would conclude that the concept 
structural links relates to the concept market structure. For the definition of 
structural links, as described above, implies that the distribution of market 
power is affected as opposed to only affecting the use of market power.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 Consultation Document, p 8. 
22 Nazzini, p 362 and 366-367. 
23 See for example Joined Cases T-68/89, T-77/89 and T-78/89 Società Italiana Vetro and 
others v Commission (“Italian Flat Glass”) ECR II-1403 [1992] where the Court of First 
Instance discusses economic links.  
24 Nazzini, p 366. 
25 See for example Case T-102/96 Gencor Ltd v Commission ECR II-753 [1999], where the 
Court of First Instance could not establish the existence of structural links when assessing 
if several undertakings were collectively dominant.  
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2.2 Applicability of the Merger Regulation 
for Concentrations with Community 
Dimension 
 
The following accounts examine the conditions for application of the 
EUMR. The conclusions contribute to ascertain what transactions are not 
subject to the current EUMR and the meaning of non-controlling minority 
shareholdings. Moreover, I explain conditions in the EUMR that could be 
considered later concerning the statistical study that predicts the amount of 
non-controlling minority shareholdings that would be regulated if the scope 
of merger control is extended.  
 
The latest version of the EUMR (139/2004) entered into force in 2004.26 A 
principle of vital importance in the EUMR is the one-stop-shop principle, 
which means that either the NCAs or the Commission have exclusive 
authority or, in other words, sole jurisdiction.27 The Commission is the 
competent authority for concentrations with a Community dimension 
according to article 1.1 EUMR. The exclusive jurisdiction is provided by 
articles 21.1 and 21.2. Thus, the Commission is not bound by any decision 
by NCAs in a case where the Commission has jurisdiction.28 The 
Commission proposes that the one-stop shop principle should remain 
unchanged in the event the scope of merger control is extended to structural 
links.29  
 
The EUMR defines the meaning of concentration in article 3.1. Firstly, a 
concentration is the merger of two or more previously independent 
undertakings or parts of undertakings. Secondly, a concentration is the 
acquisition by one or more persons already controlling at least one 
undertaking, or by one or more undertakings of direct or indirect control of 
one or more other undertakings. The explanations about the meaning of 
undertakings and control are provided in [2.3-4] below. 
 
Community dimension is a condition for the aggregate combined turnover 
of the undertakings that are part of a concentration.30 There are four ways to 
achieve the turnover threshold, and the conditions are provided in article 1.3 
EUMR. First, the turnover threshold is achieved if the aggregate worldwide 
turnover exceeds €2500 million. Second, the aggregate turnover is sufficient 
if it exceeds €100 million in at least three Member States. Third, €25 million 
suffices if it is earned by at least two concerned undertakings in at least 
three Member states. Fourth, concentrations have community dimension if 
                                                 
26 Council Regulation 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the 
EC Merger Regulation) [2004] OJ L24/1. 
27 Cook and Kerse, p 6-7. 
28 Case C-202/06 Cementbouw v Commission ECR I-12154 [2007], para 56. 
29 Consultation Document, p 7. 
30 Cook and Kerse, p 97-98.  
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the aggregate turnover within the ECC is more than €100 million. However, 
a transaction does not have community dimension if all concerned 
undertakings earn more than two thirds of its aggregate turnover in the ECC 
in only one Member state.31 
 
The Commission proposes that the turnover thresholds remain unchanged in 
case of reform.32 I believe that the thresholds are important to consider in 
any conclusions related to the brief comparative legal studies in [3.4] below. 
The account in this section shows that the combined turnovers of the parties 
limits the application of EU merger control in ways that may not be similar 
to the compared jurisdictions. Therefore, evidence as to the amount of non-
controlling minority shareholdings that would be subject to control under 
the reformed EUMR may be less than in jurisdictions without turnover 
thresholds.  
 
 
 
2.3 Concerned Undertakings 
 
It is imperative to know the meaning of the concepts concerned 
undertakings and control to understand the meaning of concentration 
according to the EUMR. It is the change of control over undertakings that 
can cause concentrations according to article 3.1 EUMR and fall within the 
scope of merger control. This section begins with a short description of the 
meaning of undertaking according to the EUMR, before moving on to 
describing the control concept.  
 
The Commission defines an undertaking as “any business with a market 
presence, to which a market turnover can be clearly attributed”.33 The 
definition relates to the principle of an autonomic economic entity.34 
Undertakings may be subsidiaries to other undertakings, thereby not 
constituting an autonomic economic entity.35 Consequently, an undertaking 
may be one or several legal persons.36 Moreover, a business may constitute 
an autonomic entity without constituting a legal entity at all.37 
 
The form of a business is irrelevant.38 This means that a single individual 
without any additional material assets may be considered an undertaking 
                                                 
31 Cook and Kerse, p 101. 
32 Consultation Document, p 7. 
33 Concentration Notice, para 24. 
34 Ibid, para 24; Drahos, p 59; Cook & Kerse, p 30.  
35 See for example Case 48/69 Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission ECR 619 
[1972], paras 132-133. 
36 Cook and Kerse, p 116. 
37 Concentration Notice, para 24. 
38 Case C-41/90 Höfner & Elser v Macrotron ECR I-2010 [1991], paras 21-23. 
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provided the person offers services on a market that fulfils the requirements 
of market presence and market turnover.39 Moreover, assets may constitute 
undertakings despite not currently being organised into a business, as long 
as it is possible to attribute a market turnover to them. Consequently, it is 
also irrelevant whether assets are organised into a legal entity. For example, 
a base of customers or clients can be considered assets that constitute an 
undertaking.40 Furthermore, franchise and licence agreements may 
constitute undertakings either in conjunction with additional assets or 
independently.41 However, the agreements have to be exclusive to be 
considered undertakings in themselves.42 The outcome of the test for 
whether business organisations, assets, agreements or individuals have 
market presence and market turnover depends on the effects on the 
concerned market. It is decisive that the market structure is affected for a 
lasting period. For example, the condition for lasting period is especially 
relevant to consider for transactions of exclusive licenses since they are 
generally given for a limited period.43  
 
 
 
2.4 Controlling Influence 
 
This section presents an investigation of the conditions for gaining control 
over undertakings according to the EUMR. The following account 
establishes the definition of non-controlling minority shareholdings. 
Shareholdings of less than half of the total shares that fail to achieve the 
threshold for controlling influence are non-controlling minority 
shareholdings.  
 
As mentioned above in [2.2], a concentration may occur from the 
acquirement of control both by single or several undertakings. Acquisitions 
by natural persons can only be considered a concentration if the individual 
already controls at least one other undertaking or is engaged in economic 
activity on his or her own account.44 There are cases where the formal 
acquirer of control is controlled by another individual or undertaking with 
the real power to exercise the controlling interests.45 The provision in article 
3.1(b) provides that control can be gained indirectly, thus including such 
                                                 
39 See for example cases Asko/Jakobs/Adia (Case IV/M.82) [1991] OJ C132 and 
Vaessen/Morris (Case IV/C-29.290) [1979] OJ L19/32. 
40 Concentration Notice, para 24; See also for example cases ECS/Sibelga (Case 
COMP/M.3318) [2003] OJ C272, and ECS/IEH (Case COMP/M.2857) [2002] OJ C286. 
41 Concentration Notice, para 24; Cook & Kerse, p 30; See also case Blokker/Toys”R”Us 
(Case IV/M.890) [1997] OJ C71, para 13. 
42 Concentration Notice, para 24. 
43 Ibid, paras 18 and 24. 
44 Ibid, para 12; see also Asko/Jakobs/Adia (Case IV/M.82) [1991] OJ C132. 
45 Cook and Kerse, p 44. 
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transactions into the scope of the EUMR.46 According to article 3.2 EUMR, 
control is acquired when the ability to exercise decisive influence on an 
undertaking is gained. The CJEU has narrowed the provision by stating that 
the ability must be effective.47 However, it is irrelevant whether the decisive 
influence is actually exercised.48 Article 3.2 EUMR lists examples of what 
decisive influence is: 
 
(a) Ownership or the right to use all or part of the assets of an undertaking; 
(b) Rights or contracts which confer the decisive influence on the composition, voting or 
decisions of the organs of an undertaking. 
 
It is clear from the text in article 3.2 EUMR that the examples are non-
exhaustive and that the Commission may consider both legal and de facto 
circumstances in the assessment of whether control has been acquired.49 It is 
important to distinguish what type of influence is relevant for the 
assessment. The Commission explains that the influence must concern the 
target undertaking’s business strategy by providing “control over decisions 
that determines strategic commercial behaviour”.50 The background for this 
reasoning can be found in Recital 20 in the EUMR, which implies that 
control has to result in a change in the market structure. Recital 20 also 
provides that several transactions may count as one if they are interrelated. 
Interrelated means that the same parties are involved in the transaction 
regarding the same undertakings and that the transactions are concluded 
closely in time.51 Therefore, non-controlling minority shareholding 
acquisitions must not be confused with interrelated acquisitions that provide 
control in conjunction.  
 
It is important to note that it is possible to gain control over strategic 
business decisions without complete ownership or a majority of voting 
rights. It because minority shareholdings may grant control according to the 
EUMR that it is necessary to use the attribute non-controlling to distinguish 
what shareholding acquisitions are not currently subject to merger control. 
Now, it is necessary to consider how minority shareholding may provide 
control. Firstly, a minority shareholding may be empowered by specific 
legal rights. For example, in CCIE/GTE a transaction of only 19 per cent of 
the shares was considered a concentration because the acquirer had a 
permanent seat in the board and additional rights of appointment to 
organs.52 In addition, veto rights for strategic business decisions are special 
rights that provide control according to the EUMR. The power to block 
decisions by veto right is an example of negative control. The concept 
negative control implies that the controller cannot enforce new decisions of 
his own accord in contrast to active control. Negative control may be shared 
                                                 
46 See also Anglo American Corporation/Lonrho (Case IV/M.754) [1997] OJ L149. 
47 Case T-282/02 Cementbouw v Commission ECR II-319 [2006], para 58. 
48 Concentration Notice, para 16.  
49 See also Concentration Notice, para 16; and Cook and Kerse, p 37. 
50 Cook and Kerse, p 38. 
51 Ibid, p 34. 
52 CCIE/GTE (Case IV/M.258) [1992] OJ C258. 
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by several parties. For example, an equal number of shares between two 
shareholders and no casting vote makes it possible for both shareholders to 
block any decision. Veto rights also provide negative control within the 
meaning of the EUMR. The concept joint control is often used to refer to 
scenarios where several parties have control over a single undertaking.53  
 
A minority shareholder may have positive or negative control from de facto 
circumstances. For example, other shareholders may be passive in that they 
generally do not participate at the shareholders meeting despite holding 
voting rights. The other shareholders may also hold very small shares in 
relation to a dominant shareholder, as is common in large public firms. The 
dominant shareholder will then be able to exercise positive or negative 
control in practice.54 Consequently, a shareholding of 35 per cent of the 
voting rights in companies with a large number of shareholders is often 
sufficient to gain control according to the EUMR.55 However, differences in 
national legislation is taken under consideration as there may be differences 
as to what legal power is granted by a certain portion of owned shares and 
whether contracts between shareholders have legal effect.56  
 
Considering the presentation so far, one may assume that joint ventures 
where parties have joint control generally fall within the scope of the 
EUMR. However, the EUMR only applies to joint ventures that perform the 
functions of an autonomic economic entity on a lasting basis, according to 
article 3.4. In legal doctrine, the condition is often referred to as a 
requirement for the joint venture to be full-function. Article 101 TFEU may 
be applicable for joint ventures that may harm effective competition but are 
not full-function according to article 2.4 EUMR, since such joint ventures 
have characteristics of cooperation rather than concentration.57 However, 
joint ventures that are not full-function from the start may be considered 
concentrations if the requirements are expected to be fulfilled in the near 
future.58 Full-function means that the joint venture “has the financial 
resources, staff and assets necessary to operate as an independent business 
on a lasting basis”.59 Furthermore, the joint venture must operate on a 
market, perform similar functions on the market as other undertakings in the 
same market, and finally be commercially independent from the parents.60 
In fulfilling these requirements, the joint venture is likely to result in a 
change in the market structure.61 As already mentioned above, Recital 20 in 
the EUMR highlights the importance of a change in the market structure for 
                                                 
53 Concentration Notice, para 62; see also Case T-282/02 Cementbouw v Commission ECR 
II-319 [2006], paras 42, 52 and 67.  
54 Concentration Notice, para 18.  
55 Cook and Kerse, p 48-50; see also for example Alfred C. Toepfer/Champagne Céréales 
(Case IV/M.557) [1995] OJ C104. 
56 Cook and Kerse, p 39. 
57 Ibid, p 8, 209-210. 
58 See for example Toray/Murata/Teijin (Case COMP/M.2763) [2002] OJ C25, para 10. 
59 Cook and Kerse, p 8. 
60 Concentration Notice, paras 93-94. 
61 Sinan and Uphoff, p 37. 
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the assessment of whether a concentration has occurred. The effect on the 
market structure is thus a decisive criterion for whether a concentration has 
occurred for both joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions.  
 
 
 
2.5 The Test for Significant Impediment on 
Effective Competition 
 
The Commission can only prohibit concentrations that are not compatible 
with the common market. A concentration is incompatible with the common 
market if it would significantly impede effective competition, according to 
articles 2.2 and 2.3 EUMR. The test for compatibility is widely known as 
the SIEC test, although the Commission refers to it as the substantive test in 
the Consultation Document. The Commission proposes that the SIEC test 
should be retained in case of reform.62 Therefore, it would have to be proven 
that non-controlling minority shareholding acquisitions may fulfil the 
criteria for incompatibility for the reform to be compatible. These 
considerations are made in chapter [3] below. The two final sections of this 
chapter investigate how transaction may be deemed incompatible with the 
common market considering the conditions of the SIEC test and purposes of 
the EUMR. 
 
The SIEC test does not limit the scope of the EUMR since it is only made 
for transactions that have already been determined to be within the scope 
according to article 3 EUMR. Nonetheless, the SIEC test is highly relevant 
to consider in the context of extending the scope. For if non-controlling 
minority shareholdings would never be capable of significantly impeding 
effective competition according to the EUMR, the extended scope would be 
without practical effect. This section describes the SIEC test generally. 
 
The Commission has the burden of proof to justify incompatibility with the 
common market, and has to refer to the prospective economic effect.63 
Moreover, there is no prejudice against compatibility from the start.64 It is 
evident from articles 2.2 and 2.3 EUMR that the SIEC test can only result in 
that a concentration is declared either compatible or incompatible with the 
common market. Thus, there can be no in-between judgement. Although the 
Commission has discretion to provide and assess the economic evidence, the 
Community Courts can review the evidence as to sufficiency and 
accuracy.65 To allow the Commission to find the evidence required to make 
                                                 
62 Consultation Document, p 7. 
63 See for example C-413/06 P Bertelsmann and Sony Corporation of America v Impala 
ECR I-04951 [2008]; Whish, p 849; Cook and Kerse, p 214.  
64 Case T-210/01 General Electric Company v Commission ECR II-5575 [2006], para 61. 
65 Case C-12/03 P Commission v Tetra Laval BV ECR I-01113 [2005], para 39.  
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its assessment, article 11 and 13 EUMR grant the Commission extensive 
powers to demand information from the acquirer, including interviews.  
 
There are several alternatives as to how to assess the level of competition. 
One alternative is to consider the level of rivalry between undertakings. 
Another option is to consider the existence of restrains on an undertakings 
economic activity by another firm. A third possibility is to test the ability of 
undertakings to influence the market price.66 Factors that are relevant to 
consider when performing the SIEC test are listed in article 2.1a and b 
EUMR, though the list is not exhaustive. Guidelines are also provided in the 
Recitals. It is evident from article 2.1 and Recital 26 that the alternatives for 
assessment mentioned above are all used in the SIEC test. The outcome of 
the test often depends on the market definition. For example, if the market 
definition implies that there are few competing undertakings (oligopolistic 
or monopolistic market structures), there is naturally a larger chance that a 
concentration is considered harmful.67  
 
Bishop and Walker point out that there are weaknesses with only assessing 
the levels of competitiveness that are discussed in the previous paragraph 
above. Competition may be satisfactorily effective despite less rivalry, 
existing restraints on competing undertakings or the possibility to influence 
market prices. In addition, it is unknown as to what extent of decreased 
rivalry, for example, would harm competition to the extent that effective 
competition no longer exists.68 Therefore, the outcome for consumer welfare 
should be considered an important factor to investigate.69 Indeed, the 
outcome for consumer welfare is a decisive factor in the SIEC test.70 Benefit 
for consumers is an efficiency restriction that applies to the EUMR 
according to Recital 29.71  
 
In the event that the Commission comes to the conclusion that a 
concentration would significantly impede effective competition, the 
concentration does not necessarily have to be prohibited. Articles 6.2 and 
8.2 EUMR provides the possibility for remedies, which allow the parties in 
a notified concentration to make commitments that obviate competition 
issues. Thus, a problematic concentration can become acceptable without 
the need for the parties to make a new notification. In practice, remedies are 
very common. A very high portion of problematic transactions are cleared 
as compatible with the common market because of commitments.72 
 
 
                                                 
66 Bishop and Walker, p 17-20. 
67 Recital 25 EUMR; Cook and Kerse, p  
68 Bishop and Walker, p 20-21. 
69 Ibid, p 20-21; See also Nazzini, p 92-94; and Whish, p 4. 
70 Whish, p 863-864; Zimmer, p 24-25. 
71 See also for example Ryanair/Aer Lingus (Case COMP/M4439) [2007] OJ C47, para 
1100. 
72 Merger Statistics; Cook and Kerse, p 282. 
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2.6 Effective Competition and Other 
Purposes  
 
The assessment of whether effective competition has been significantly 
impeded depends first and foremost on the definition of effective 
competition. The investigation below suggests a definition that could be 
used with regard to the purposes of the EUMR and other purposes in EU 
law. Thereby, the account presents conclusions about the level of 
competition that the EUMR purposes to maintain. 
 
According to economic theory, perfectly effective competition exists where 
there is complete absence of market power, which is defined as “the ability 
to raise prices above the competitive price level”.73 Consequently, any 
ability or practical effect in a market that could cause prices to increase 
above the competitive price level in a market would qualify as a threat to 
effective competition. However, most undertakings possess at least some 
degree of market power in practice, and this is perhaps not always a 
problem where market power is not significant. Therefore, economists often 
make the distinction between significant and insignificant market power.74  
 
Economic theory about effective competition cannot fully explain the 
meaning of the concept in EUMR. For according to article 2.1, the 
assessment according to the SIEC test must be conducted with consideration 
to the objectives of the regulation. The Recitals in the Preamble to the 
EUMR show that the purpose to protect effective competition is limited by 
several other purposes. Recital 6 refers to article 5 TFEU that requires 
proportionality and subsidiarity in EU legal policy and practice. 
Consequently, Recital 7 provides that the EUMR should only apply to 
significant structural changes.75 Furthermore, Recital 3 refers to 
consideration for the objectives to promote trade in the internal market. This 
relates to the objective in EU competition law for market integration. The 
main objectives for EU competition law are provided by article 119 TFEU: 
“[…] economic policy [should be] based on the close coordination of 
Member States’ economic policies, on the internal market […] and 
conducted in the accordance with the principle of ‘open market economy 
with free competition’”. The article shows that the objective for effective 
competition is stipulated in relation to goals for market integration. One 
feature of the goal for market integration is approximation of the 
competition policies of the Member States. The other feature of the 
objective for market integration is promotion of cross-border trade and 
expansion of territorial markets for products. The objectives for effective 
                                                 
73 Bishop and Walker, p 6. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Compare with the condition for controlling influence for application of the EUMR as 
discussed in [2.4]. 
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competition and market integration may conflict with each other.76 For 
example, the objective for a common policy could dissuade legal reform 
that diverges too much from the competition policy of Member States. 
Moreover, a concentration might cause anti-completive effects while 
contributing to increased cross-border trade.77  
 
Since the assessment of harm on competition is subject to considerations to 
other objectives makes it less simple to assess whether effective competition 
has been significantly impeded. In case of conflict, the Commission 
considers the conflicting goals separately and then tries to find a balance 
considering the net outcome for economic efficiency.78  Considering all that 
has been discussed in this section and above in [2.5], significant impediment 
on effective competition according to the EUMR could be defined as the 
creation of an ability to exercise significant market power that may harm 
consumer welfare and cause an overall negative effect on economic 
performance.  
 
                                                 
76 Drahos, p 54; Bishop and Walker, p 8. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid; Whish, p 4. 
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3. The Need to Regulate Structural 
Links 
3.1 Anti-competitive Effects by Non-
controlling Minority Shareholdings 
According to Economic Theory 
 
This section describes the economic investigation presented by the 
Commission in Annex I to the Consultation Document on anti-competitive 
effects by non-controlling minority shareholding acquisitions. To begin 
with, it is evident from the investigation that non-controlling minority 
shareholdings cause less significant anti-competitive effects than controlling 
shareholdings, and that the magnitude of the effects are often proportional to 
the level of influence or size of the shareholding.79 Nonetheless, the 
Commission argues that the economic investigation shows that economic 
theory supports that non-controlling minority shareholdings may cause 
significant impediment on effective competition.80  
 
A non-controlling minority shareholdings may provide influence over the 
target undertaking’s commercial conduct. Consequently, a lack of decisive 
influence (control) does not exclude a level of influence that may 
significantly impede competition. The Commission uses the concept 
material influence to refer to such influence that does not achieve the 
threshold for decisive influence.81 A minority shareholding may not grant 
the ability to block strategic business decisions to the extent that decisive 
influence is achieved according to EUMR, but still be used to exercise 
negative control sometimes. If the target undertaking has no dominant 
shareholder and shares are well spread among the shareholders, there may 
be much fluctuation as to the level of influence at the shareholders meeting. 
The ability to block a decision in a few cases would not be decisive 
influence, but the commercial policy of the target undertaking could have 
been significantly influenced nonetheless. For example, a minority 
shareholder may be able to form informal coalitions that can affect 
commercial decisions. In addition, some strategic business decisions might 
require qualified majority decisions, thereby also allowing negative control 
is some but not all instances.82  
 
                                                 
79 Annex I to Consultation Document, paras 3 and 5. 
80 Ibid, para 3.  
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid, paras 29, 32-36. 
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Moving on, non-controlling minority shareholdings could cause unilateral 
effects, both in horizontal and non-horizontal relationships. Unilateral 
effects means that one undertaking’s market power is increased from a 
merger or acquisition without coordination or cooperation with the target 
undertaking.83 In horizontal relationships, a non-controlling minority 
shareholding acquisition could reduce the incentive to compete because the 
acquirer would share profits with the other undertaking.84 Thus, passive 
investments without any commercial influence on the competing 
undertaking could cause unilateral effects. There would be a similar effect 
in non-horizontal relationships if the acquirer owns shares in a supplier to 
the competing undertaking, thereby also sharing profits.85 If the non-
controlling minority shareholding would be as large as to conferring 
commercial influence, the unilateral effect in horizontal relationships would 
be “severe”.86 As to non-vertical relationships, commercial influence in a 
supplier from non-controlling minority shareholdings could result in price 
discrimination to the acquirer’s advantage.87 Unilateral effects are highly 
relevant to consider under the current merger regulation, as is evident from 
Recital 25 EUMR. 
 
Another argument provided by the economic investigation is that non-
controlling minority shareholdings can cause coordinated effects in 
horizontal relationships. In contrast to unilateral effect, coordinated effects 
means that market power is increased by “tacit collusion” between two or 
more undertakings in a market.88 For example, the acquirer may gain insight 
in the target undertakings commercial policy and adjust its own policy 
accordingly to enable higher prices.89 In addition, aggressive competition 
with the target undertakings that could cause losses for the target 
undertaking would negatively affect the acquirer. Therefore, the acquirer 
would adjust its competitive behaviour towards the target undertaking.90 A 
problem related to coordinated effects concern the barriers to entry. The 
investigations suggests that non-controlling minority shareholdings in 
undertakings that are not currently competitors decrease the probability that 
the target undertaking enters the market and becomes a competitor because 
of tacit collusion. Another possibility is that the target undertaking may 
found itself at disadvantage in relation to the acquirer due to what 
previously has been said about material influence.91  
 
 
 
                                                 
83 See [2.6] for definition of market power. 
84 Annex I to Consultation Document, para 4.  
85 Ibid, para 11. 
86 Ibid, para 6. 
87 Ibid, para 11. 
88 Ibid, para 8. 
89 Ibid, para 9. 
90 Ibid, para 37. 
91 Ibid, paras 76-78. 
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3.2 Assessment of Non-controlling 
Minority Shareholdings in Commission 
Legal Practice 
 
Non-controlling minority shareholdings that are in a related product market 
as a notified concentration and either provide interlocking directorship or 
include at least 10 per cent of the shares must be included in notifications of 
concentrations.92 Thus, the Commission currently considers non-controlling 
minority shareholdings under the EUMR to some extent. This section 
provides a few examples of the assessment of anti-competitive effects of 
non-controlling minority shareholdings in past legal practice that relates to 
the EUMR. The examination shows whether the results of the 
Commission’s theoretical economic investigation can be supported by 
experiences in legal practice.  
 
Non-controlling minority shareholdings that are investigated may be 
significant or even decisive for the outcome of the SIEC test as will be 
illustrated below. Indeed, many of the anti-competitive effects that are 
discussed in the Commission’s economic investigation have been assessed 
in legal practice. The conclusions regarding non-controlling minority 
shareholdings in legal practice relies on the Commission’s ability to allow 
remedies by requiring divesting shares for example.93 For example, where 
the divestment non-controlling minority shareholding has been sufficient as 
remedy, the shareholding was decisive for the assessment that a 
concentration would significantly impede effective competition.  
 
In Siemens/VA Tech, the acquisition of VA Tech by Siemens was 
considered compatible with the common market after Siemens made 
promises to dispose of corporate rights related to a non-controlling minority 
shareholding of 28 per cent in SMS Demag, a close competitor to VA 
Tech.94 Thus, the non-controlling minority shareholding in SMS Demag was 
the decisive factor in the assessment that Siemens’ acquisition of control in 
VA Tech would significantly impede effective competition if there had not 
been any remedies.95 Despite the fact that Siemens did not have control over 
SMS Demag, the minority shareholding was deemed likely to affect the 
competitive behaviour of Siemens/VA Tech towards SMS Demag. The 
effect on competitive behaviour was explained partly because of the 
financial interest in SMS Demag and the resulting unilateral effects, but also 
because of the access to strategic business information.96  
                                                 
92 Form CO Relating to the notification of a concentration pursuant to regulation No 
139/2004, sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2; Schmidt, p 211. 
93 See chapter [2.5] about remedies.  
94 Siemens/VA Tech (Case COMP/M.3653) [2005] OJ L353; Annex II to the Consultation 
Document, paras 31-33. 
95 Siemens/VA Tech (Case COMP/M.3653) [2005] OJ L353, paras 222 and 306. 
96 Ibid, paras 326-328 and 335. 
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Siemens VA tech concerned competition issues from a non-controlling 
minority shareholding in a horizontal relationship. However, E.ON/MOL 
proves that non-controlling minority shareholdings may cause significant 
impediment on effective competition as well.97 E.ON acquired control over 
subsidiaries to MOL, in which MOL would retain 25 per cent of the shares. 
MOL was in a vertically related market as E.ON, and the non-controlling 
minority shareholdings would cause price discrimination by MOL to 
E.ON’s competitors. MOL agreed to divest the previously retained minority 
shareholdings as remedy.98 Consequently, the non-controlling minority 
shareholdings were decisive for the assessment that effective competition 
would be significantly impeded in similarity to the scenario in Siemens/VA 
Tech.   
 
It has also been proven by legal practice that a non-controlling minority 
shareholding may entail influence as to the target undertakings commercial 
policy. For example, in IPIC/MAN Ferrostaal a 30 per cent shareholding 
held by MAN Ferrostaal in a third undertaking provided “significant” 
influence in that some strategic business decisions could be influenced due 
to corporate statutes that required very high majorities.99 The influence was 
not controlling since it was only significant and not decisive. Nonetheless, 
the minority shareholding in the third company had to be divested for the 
notified concentration to be cleared. Thus, the non-controlling minority 
shareholding was decisive for the assessment that competition would be 
significantly impeded in similarity to Siemens/VA Tech and E.ON/MOL. 
IPIC/MAN Ferrostaal arguably proves that material influence may exist and 
cause significant anti-competitive effects, thus supporting theories presented 
in the Commission’s economic investigation.100  
 
As regards the required size of a non-controlling minority shareholdings for 
the possibility to cause competition concerns, legal practice confirms that 
very small shareholdings may be sufficient. For example, a non-controlling 
minority shareholding of only 7.79 per cent was considered causing 
unilateral effects in Glencore/Xstrata, where Glencore would gain control 
over Xstrata.101 The non-controlling minority shareholding was in a third 
party company in the same market. However, it is uncertain exactly how 
significant the non-controlling minority shareholdings was in the 
assessment, since divesting the shareholding was only one of the measures 
Glencore had to take for not significantly impeding effective competition by 
                                                 
97 E.ON/MOL (Case M.3696) [2005] OJ L253; Annex II to the Consultation Document, 
paras 27-30. 
98 Annex II to the Consultation Document, para 30. 
99 IPIC/MAN Ferrostaal (Case M.5406) [2009] OJ C114; Annex II to the Consultation 
Document, para 20. 
100 See [3.1]. 
101 Glencore/Xstrata (Case M.6541) [2012] OJ C19; Annex II to the Consultation 
Document, para 16. 
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gaining control over Xstrata.102 Examples of assessments in legal practice 
where smaller non-controlling minority shareholdings than 25 per cent have 
been proven to be decisive for the outcome of the SIEC test have not been 
found. However, since 17 per cent of the shares could provide decisive 
influence in CCIE/GTE as mentioned above in [2.4], one could speculate 
that very small non-controlling minority shareholdings could provide 
material influence as well. The speculation is supported by the conclusion in 
[2.4] that rights or other de facto circumstances related to a shareholding 
may grant influence and become subject to the EUMR.  
 
 
 
3.3 The Commission’s Predictions as to 
the Amount of Problematic 
Acquisitions 
 
The investigation presented above in [3.2] have proved that non-controlling 
minority shareholdings can significantly impede effective competition. 
Now, it will be considered to what extent the Commission’s proposal to 
extend the scope of merger control to non-controlling minority shareholding 
acquisitions could be assessed in practice considering the turnover 
thresholds and amount of transactions. For if non-controlling minority 
shareholding acquisitions are few or rarely achieve the requirements for 
community dimension in practice, then reform would arguably be without 
effect anyway.  
 
In 2001, the Commission conducted a competition review in which it 
commented on the need to extend the scope of merger control to non-
controlling minority shareholding acquisitions.103 The Commission 
considered the amount of non-controlling minority shareholding 
acquisitions with community dimension that could significantly impede 
effective competition. The investigation was supported by experiences in its 
own practice and hypothetical possibilities to use articles 101 or 102. The 
results made the Commission predict that the amount would likely be 
small.104 The fact is that the Commission has only assessed non-controlling 
minority shareholdings on 53 occasions in relation to notified concentrations 
until last year. The shareholdings were considered “problematic” in only 
about 20 of those assessments, of which even less were decisive for the 
outcome of the SIEC test.105 According to merger statistics, the mean 
number of assessed transactions every year since 2000 is about 300.106 The 
                                                 
102 Annex II to the Consultation Document, paras 15-17. 
103 Green Paper. 
104 Consultation Document, p 6; Green Paper, paras 106-109. 
105 Annex II to the Consultation Document, para 3. 
106 Commission Merger Statistics. 
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competition review from 2001 needs to be challenged to prove that reform 
would have a larger effect in practice than is suggested by the data above. 
 
There are numerous factors that contribute to an argument that the 
prediction from 2001 is outdated and not credible. First of all, the 
Commission conceded that the investigation that resulted in the prediction 
was based on limited data.107 Second, the cases discussed in [3.2] that prove 
that non-controlling minority shareholdings may significantly impede 
effective competition have all been assessed after 2001. Third, and most 
importantly, experiences from legal practice as to non-controlling minority 
shareholdings under the EUMR do not provide credible data for predicting 
the amount of problematic transactions.  
 
The amount of non-controlling minority shareholdings that would be subject 
to control under a reformed EUMR could be predicted by studying statistics 
of ownership transactions within the EU. That would allow calculation of 
the number of minority shareholding acquisitions in related markets that 
achieve the turnover thresholds. This is exactly the kind of study that the 
Commission has conducted recently and presented in Annex II to the 
Consultation Document. The statistics are found in the Zephyr database. It 
contains information of transactions of ownership in registered companies in 
all 27 Member States.108 Moreover, the database contains information about 
“sectorial activities” of the companies, which means that the database 
provide indications of relevant markets.109 Thereby, potential competition 
concerns could be identified.110 The Commission’s research method was to 
identify transactions between companies in horizontal relationships that 
achieve the turnover thresholds for community dimension but could not 
achieve controlling influence.111 The results show that about 5 per cent of 
the number of notified concentrations per year is the number of non-
controlling minority shareholdings that could have been controlled if the 
EUMR applied to non-controlling minority shareholdings.112 Undoubtedly, 
the investigation shows that the number of problematic non-controlling 
minority shareholding acquisitions would be considerably less than 
transactions that are already within the scope. However, the limitations of 
the study as to only considering horizontal effects in registered companies 
suggest that the number of problematic non-controlling minority 
shareholding acquisitions could be somewhat higher in reality.  
 
 
 
                                                 
107 Green Paper, para 109. 
108 Annex II to the Consultation Document, para 91. 
109 Ibid, para 92. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid, paras 94-95. 
112 Ibid, paras 97-100. 
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3.4 Comparative Perspectives with 
Germany and the UK 
 
The Commission is by no means a pioneer in proposing that non-controlling 
minority shareholding acquisitions should be subject to merger control. 
Indeed, non-controlling minority shareholdings are regulated in several 
major national jurisdictions both within and outside of the EU.113 Studying 
how non-controlling minority acquisitions have been regulated and how 
many such transactions have been scrutinised in legal practice will provide 
evidence for what effect the Commission’s reform proposal may have. 
Current regulations of non-controlling minority shareholdings thus provide 
sources of empirical data. This section presents the main features of the 
regulations in Germany and the UK as to non-controlling minority 
shareholding acquisitions.  
 
In the UK, the relevant provisions on merger control are found in the 
Enterprise Act (2002). Merger control applies to transactions that cause 
enterprises to cease being distinct enterprises, which according to article 
26.3 may occur from material influence. The criteria for merger control 
application are in many ways similar to the EUMR in that the level of 
influence is a significant factor. For in the assessment of the existence of 
material influence exist, the NCA considers both legal and practical 
circumstances that may confer influence, such as right of appointment to 
company organs or veto right. Any minority shareholding acquisition that 
makes the acquirer owner of at least 15 per cent of the shares merits control. 
However, smaller acquisitions are not excluded since the level of influence 
is the decisive criterion.114 Material influence in the UK requires less 
influence than decisive influence under the EUMR. Instead of decisive 
influence, it is sufficient for a transaction to provide significant influence.115 
The difference can be illustrated by a case from UK legal practice 
concerning an acquisition of 17.9 per cent.116 The possibilities for negative 
control were assessed although the shareholding did not legally provide 
such influence. Like in merger control under the EUMR, de facto 
circumstances were considered. Although the acquirer did not have veto 
right in all circumstances, the threshold for material influence was 
achieved.117 The case shows how the condition for material influence is less 
strict than decisive influence under the EUMR. 
 
The substantive test under the Enterprise Act 2002 is also similar to the test 
under the EUMR as implied by the wording “substantial lessening of 
                                                 
113 Consultation Document, p 5-6. 
114 Annex II to the Consultation Document, para 70; Slaughter and May, p 3-4. 
115 Annex II to the Consultation Document, para 70. 
116 ITV PLC/British Sky Broadcasting Group PLC, Report of the Competition Commission 
to the Secretary of State [2007]. 
117 Ibid, p 29. 
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competition”.118 In the UK about 5 per cent of all investigated transactions 
under the Enterprise Act 2002 are non-controlling minority shareholding 
acquisitions.119 Thus, statistics from legal practice in the UK supports the 
Commission’s prediction on the amount of transactions that could possibly 
impede effective competition but are currently not within the scope of the 
EUMR.  
 
There are many similarities between control of non-controlling minority 
shareholdings in the UK and Germany. The relevant legal provisions are 
provided in GWB. According to §37 and §39, concentrations are subject to 
merger control. Non-controlling minority shareholdings constitute 
concentrations if they either include 25 per cent of the total shares in the 
target undertaking or provide “competitively significant influence” 
according to §37(1) no 3 and 4. Competitively significant influence is 
similar to material influence as described in [3.1] in that both legal and de 
facto circumstances may be considered for the assessment that the acquirer 
gains influence in the target undertaking that may give cause to prohibition. 
For example, in A-Tec Industries AG/Norddeutsche Affinerie AG, a 
shareholding of about 13 per cent provided negative control from the fact 
that there was low participation at the shareholders meeting.120  
 
Two other cases show how German law applies merger control to non-
controlling minority shareholdings. In Mainova/Aschaffenburger, a 
shareholding acquisition of 17.5 per cent could cause coordinated effects in 
a vertical relationship.121 The German NCA believed that the coordinated 
effects derived from de facto circumstances that would increase the 
acquirer’s dominant position. However, the acquirer would have only 
limited ability to influence the commercial policy of the target undertaking. 
Nonetheless, the transaction was prohibited. Another example in German 
legal practice, M. DuMont Schauberg/Bonner Zeitungsdruckerei, illustrates 
how unilateral effects were sufficient for the assessment that the transaction 
should be prohibited.122 The acquirer only acquired 18 per cent of the 
shares. The shareholding provided additional rights of profits, but no ability 
to influence the commercial policy.  
 
More than 10 per cent of all transactions that are assessed in German 
Merger Control are minority shareholdings that achieve the threshold for 25 
per cent total shareholding and are prohibited for anti-competitive effects.123 
However, it is uncertain how many of the minority shareholdings that would 
fulfil the conditions for controlling influence under the EUMR. Only 0.6 per 
cent of all transactions are assessed for providing competitively significant 
influence. On the other hand, 11 per cent of those assessments lead to 
                                                 
118 Slaughter and May, p 17-21. 
119 Annex II to the Consultation Document, para 71. 
120 Case B5- 198/07 A-Tec Industries AG / Norddeutsche Affinerie AG [2008]. 
121 Case B8-27/04 Mainova AG/Aschaffenburger Versorgungs AG [2004]. 
122 Case B6- 27/04 M. DuMont Schauberg/Bonner Zeitungsdruckerei [2004]. 
123 Annex II to the Consultation Document, para 46. 
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prohibition.124 Moreover, some transactions that provide competitively 
significant influence may fall into the other category for including 25 per 
cent of the shares.125  
 
 
 
3.5 Views by Consulted Organisations 
 
The Commission’s proposal to extend the scope of merger control have 
received mixed feedback. This section highlight some arguments raised by 
consulted organisation as presented in their replies to the Consultation 
Document. It is perhaps unsurprising that the NCAs in the UK and Germany 
are supporters to extending the scope of merger control. Both have backed 
the possible anti-competitive effects of non-controlling minority 
shareholdings and the need to control such acquisitions under the EUMR.126 
OFT favoured that non-controlling minority shareholdings that grant 
material influence should be subject to merger control, as in domestic law. 
In similarity Bundeskartellamt asked for the same level of protection of 
competition as in domestic law, but also argued for the need to establish that 
any gaps in EU merger control law can be remedied in practice.127  
 
ICC and IBA are altogether critical for two main reasons. First, they do not 
believe that the Commission has sufficiently proved that there is a need to 
control non-controlling minority shareholdings. Second, they believe that 
current law allows sufficient tools for control.128 The second aspect is 
further investigated below in [4]. About the insufficiency of proof, IBA 
stated that the investigations of statistics in the Zephyr database and past 
legal practice under EUMR show that very few non-controlling minority 
shareholding acquisitions are likely to significantly impede effective 
competition. It would not be proportional to extend the scope considering 
the increased burden on the business community.129 The final aspect that 
considers the burden on the business community is actually recognised in 
many of the studied Consultation replies, including OFT and 
Bundeskartellamt.130 OFT thus proposed that few non-controlling minority 
shareholdings should qualify as structural links to minimise the burden.131 
 
                                                 
124 Annex II to the Consultation Document, para 46. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Reply by OFT; Reply by Bundeskartellamt. 
127 Reply by Bundeskartellamt, p 3. 
128 Reply by ICC, p 3; Reply by IBA, p 3-4. 
129 Reply by IBA, p 3-4. 
130 Reply by OFT, p 3; Reply by Bundeskartellamt, p 2. 
131 Reply by OFT, p 3 
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The law firms are also generally critical towards the Commission’s 
proposal.132 According to Vinge and Linklaters, a gap in the law is “very 
narrow” in that very few transactions would merit prohibition.133 On the 
other hand, Mayer Brown rejects that there is a gap in the law altogether.134 
Moreover, Mayer Brown identified the problem with changing the law as to 
legal clarity. Possibly, legal reform could create much uncertainty due the 
upheaval of the well-established legal practice related to the threshold of 
controlling influence.135 
 
ECLF presents a nuanced view in that it recognises that non-controlling 
minority shareholdings may have anti-competitive effects. On the other 
hand, the ECLF is not persuaded that it has been proven that legal reform 
would have significant effect in practice due to the requirements in the SIEC 
test for example.136 The purpose for proportionality could discourage 
reform. The ECLF predicts that many Member states will tag along and 
extend merger control scope. The Commission’s reform may thus cause a 
greater effect than is anticipated in the Consultation document. The 
Commission have not presented sufficient research as to the practical effects 
of legal reform that concern other aspects of society than the effects for 
competition.137 
 
Despite being against an extended scope of merger control, the IBA 
commented on the best way to qualify what non-controlling minority 
shareholdings are structural links. Concepts like material influence are 
problematic in that their meanings are subject to interpretation. Legal 
uncertainty should be avoided, and it would therefore be better to set a fixed 
percentage as a threshold for application.138 For legal uncertainty may 
“dissuade much needed capital market investments”.139 
                                                 
132 See for example Reply by Mayer Brown; Reply by Vinge; and Reply by Linklaters.  
133 Reply by Vinge,p 1; and Reply by Linklaters, p 1. 
134 Reply by Mayer Brown 
135 Ibid, p 2-3. 
136 Reply by ECLF, p 1. 
137 Ibid, p 2-3. 
138 Reply by IBA, p 4. 
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4. The Uses of Current Law for 
Control over Non-controlling 
Minority Shareholdings 
4.1 Exposing the Limitations of the Merger 
Regulation 
 
This chapter relates to the second research question about the uses of current 
law. The previous chapter has already explained that non-controlling 
minority shareholdings have been assessed under the EUMR in some cases 
despite the fact the EUMR only applies to concentrations. However, all 
cases that are discussed in [3.2] are similar in two ways. First, the non-
controlling minority shareholdings were only assessed in relation to a 
notified concentration. It is evident from the introductory paragraph in [3.2] 
that the Commission relies on the notification of a concentration for the 
assessment of non-controlling minority shareholdings. Furthermore, the 
shareholdings have to be related to any of the concerned parties in the 
transaction that does involve the transfer of controlling influence.140  
 
The second similarity between the discussed cases in [3.2] is that all non-
controlling minority shareholdings that could be controlled were 
shareholdings in undertakings other than the concerned undertakings. 
Furthermore, the method the Commission used for control was not 
prohibition, but agreement with the concerned undertakings that the 
concentration would be cleared if the non-controlling minority 
shareholdings were divested. What if the problematic non-controlling 
minority shareholding was a pre-existing shareholding in an undertaking 
targeted for controlling influence? Could the Commission require the 
divestment of the pre-existing shares in an assessment of a subsequent gain 
of controlling influence? The scenario was identical in Ryanair/Aer Lingus, 
where Ryanair intended to buy all shares in Aer Lingus and acquire control 
by launching a public bid.141 In other words, Ryanair intended to make a 
hostile takeover. Before the public bid, Ryanair had acquired about 19 per 
cent of the shares. The acquisition was not a concentration according to the 
EUMR. However, when Ryanair subsequently launched a public bid with 
the intent of acquiring control over Aer Lingus, the Commission prohibited 
the concentration according to article 8.3 EUMR since the concentration 
                                                 
140 Consultation Document, p 4. 
141 Ryanair/Aer Lingus (Case COMP/M4439) [2007] OJ C47; and Case T-411/07 Aer 
Lingus v Commission ECR II-3691 [2010]. 
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would be incompatible with the common market.142 Since the EUMR allows 
an exception from the suspension rule for public bids, Ryanair had acquired 
additional shares before the Commission declared the concentration 
incompatible. Ryanair would thus be required to divest shares that provided 
control according to article 8.4 EUMR, but 29.4 per cent of the shares were 
retained. The Commission did not order Ryanair to divest the remaining 
shares since they did not achieve the threshold for controlling influence.143 
Aer Lingus then appealed to the General Court against the Commission’s 
decision. However, the Court provided an extensive account that declared 
that the Commission’s assessment had been correct.144 Nonetheless, the 
Court did not reject the fact that Ryanair could influence the commercial 
policy of Aer Lingus with its non-controlling minority shareholding and that 
it could potentially significantly impede effective competition. The 
assessment would be irrelevant to do though since the EUMR could not be 
applied.145  
 
 
 
4.2 The Illusive Exclusivity of the Merger 
Regulation  
 
The following accounts provide proof that limitations in the EUMR may not 
mean that other legal provisions are not applicable to non-controlling 
minority shareholdings. The Commission had performed merger control 
since long before the Merger Regulation of 1989 by using articles 101 and 
102 TFEU.146 The use of the articles for merger control have not been clear 
historically though, and in the end the ambiguity fuelled the Council to 
adopt the Merger Regulation.147 However, there were also other problems in 
using the TFEU to regulate concentrations. One of the main issues was that 
articles 101 and 102 TFEU arguably did not allow sufficient scope of 
control. Another major issue was the sanctions that are possible to enforce 
according to the articles. Concentrations were prohibited by declaring the 
transaction null and void, a result that perhaps was inappropriate in many 
cases.148 Nevertheless, the articles are the only provisions other than the 
EUMR that may be applicable to mergers and acquisitions, and they may 
allow merger control of certain non-controlling minority shareholding 
acquisitions as will be elaborated below.  
 
                                                 
142 Ryanair/Aer Lingus (Case COMP/M4439) [2007] OJ C47, para 1240. 
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144 Ibid, paras 61-67. 
145 Ibid, see for example paras 84-87. 
146 Previously articles 81 and 82 TEU, and before that articles 85 and 86 respectively.  
147 Cook and Kerse, p 4. 
148 Ibid, p 3. 
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The Commission has not used articles 101 and 102 TFEU for merger 
control since the first Merger Regulation entered into force. The Merger 
Regulation was, and still is, regarded by the Commission as the one and 
only legal catalogue with provisions applicable for mergers and 
acquisitions.149 After all, the Merger Regulation is intended as, and designed 
to be, the only required tool for the Commission to perform merger control. 
Thus, subsequent changes to merger control in the EU have been 
implemented by amending the Merger Regulation as opposed to using other 
provisions of competition law.150  However, there is no legal obligation for 
the exclusive status of the Merger Regulation for merger control 
procedures.151 In fact, the applicability of articles 101 and 102 TFEU for 
some concentrations is supported by Recital 7 in EUMR itself. The 
background for the exclusive use of the EUMR is better explained as the 
result of diplomacy, since the Member States had struggled to agree on a 
uniform legal tool for the Commission’s merger control since the 
seventies.152 One could speculate that the adoption of the Merger Regulation 
was such a significant political accomplishment that the Commission 
became cautious and unwilling to move outside of the confines of the 
EUMR in merger control procedures.153  
 
 
 
4.3 Application of the Cartel Prohibition 
for Shareholding Acquisitions 
 
The provisions in article 101 apply to agreements and concerted practices 
between economically independent undertakings (cartels). An obvious 
limitation for the use of the article for merger control is that the concerned 
parties in mergers and acquisitions are often shareholders acting in their 
own capacity rather than that of the undertaking.154 Therefore, transaction 
agreements of shares in limited companies should not be subject to scrutiny 
under article 101 by default. Moreover, the Commission has claimed that 
there is a need to distinguish between concentrations and cartels, and thus 
initially believed that article 101 had no application for mergers and 
acquisitions.155 After about 20 years since the Commission’s notice on the 
inapplicability of article 101, the certainty regarding the application was 
                                                 
149 Bos and others, p 90-91. 
150 Ibid, p 119-222; Cook and Kerse, p 1, 4-5 
151 Schmidt, p 211.  
152 Cook and Kerse, p 4; Drahos, p 80. 
153 Compare with the view reflected in Bos and others, p 90: “the Commission has never 
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to do”. 
154 Bos and others, p 75. 
155 Commission Information Memo P-1/66 Concentration of Firms in the Common Market 
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thwarted by the CJEU in the Philip Morris judgement.156 The Court 
stated:157 
 
Although the acquisition by one company of an equity interest in a competitor does not in 
itself constitute conduct of restricting competition, such an acquisition may nevertheless 
serve as an instrument for influencing the commercial conduct of the companies in question 
so as to restrict or distort competition […]. 
 
The issue in the Philip Morris case was the acquisition of a minority 
shareholding of 30.8 per cent (but 24.9 per cent of voting rights) by Philip 
Morris in the competing undertaking Rothmans, and special rights granted 
by the transactions agreement. Although the CJEU ruled that the transaction 
in the case did not constitute an agreement that restricted competition, the 
circumstances that could offend article 101 were discussed. Notably, the 
discussion suggested that a lower level of influence than is required in the 
current EUMR was sufficient for the assessment that the transaction could 
prevent, restrict or distort competition according to article 101. The CJEU 
stated that a transaction of shares could harm competition in an oligopolistic 
market since a shareholding acquisition may provide commercial influence 
to the acquirer due to the “establishment of links” between the 
competitors.158 Any rights granted by a shareholding might be considered 
harmful for competition, provided that the rights allowed influence of the 
commercial conduct of the competing undertaking. The CJEU identified 
that the acquisition of control in particular could harm competition, but did 
not exclude the possibility that a lower level of influence could be 
sufficient.159 However, a purely passive investment would not offend article 
101 according to the CJEU.160 Consequently, the Philip Morris judgement 
suggested that a non-controlling minority shareholding might harm 
competition if it grants commercial influence.  
 
However, The Philip Morris judgement was clouded by ambiguity. 
Commentators disagreed on the interpretation of the legal precedent 
conveyed by the CJEU. Some believed that the case proved a broad 
interpretation of article 101, meaning it was applicable to shareholding 
acquisitions. Others argued for a continued restrictive interpretation.161 
Indeed, Philip Morris was the spark for the ambiguity of merger control law 
that paved the way for the Merger Regulation, which entered into force just 
two years after the judgement.162 The main argument by the commentators 
that favoured the restrictive interpretation was that the CJEU would never 
have applied article 101 to any acquisition of control. The argument referred 
to the principle that article 101 only applies if parties in a transaction are 
                                                 
156 Joined Cases 142 and 156/84 BAT and Reynolds v Commission (“Philip Morris”) ECR 
4487 [1987]. 
157 Ibid, para 37. 
158 Ibid, para 32. 
159 Ibid, para 38. 
160 Ibid, para 34. 
161 Bos and others, p 70. 
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independent undertakings, and that a controlling acquisition would disrupt 
the criterion of independent undertakings.163 The However, the criticism did 
not concern the application of article 101 to non-controlling minority 
shareholdings. Apparently, there is no disagreement that agreements 
between undertakings that provide non-controlling stakes may be subject to 
article 101.  
 
 
 
4.4 Mergers and Acquisitions Constituting 
Abusive Behaviour 
 
In contrast to article 101, the view on the application of article 102 has been 
rather consistent throughout history. The provision applies to abusive 
behaviour by undertakings that enjoy a dominant position on a market. In 
Continental Can, the CJEU concluded that the acquisition of a competitor 
by a dominant undertaking may qualify as abusive behaviour.164 However, 
an offence against article 102 could only be established if effective 
competition in the market would become virtually eliminated because of the 
transaction.165 Thus, article 102 TFEU has two significant limitations for 
merger control. First, an offence cannot be established unless the acquirer is 
already dominant, regardless whether the acquisition would result in 
dominance or monopoly. Second, the additional condition for virtually 
eliminated competition further narrowed the scope of control. Notably 
though, the CJEU admitted that the condition for virtual elimination of 
competition would not necessarily apply in all cases, but the condition was 
not fully eroded before the first merger regulation entered into force.166  
 
The ambiguous requirement for virtual elimination of competition 
concerned the overall market structure, but not the level of influence in a 
competitor that is required for the assessment that an acquisition could 
constitute an abuse. The Commission established an infringement of article 
102 in Gillette/Wilkinson Sword, where the transaction involved a non-
controlling minority shareholding.167 The Commission referred to the 
assessment by the CJEU in Philip Morris that some influence of the 
competitor’s commercial policy could be sufficient.168 Thus, article 102 
applies to non-controlling minority shareholding acquisitions in limited 
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circumstances. It is interesting that the criterion used in Continental Can 
that competition would have be virtually eliminated for application of article 
102 is nowhere to be found in the Gillette/Wilkinson Sword decision. 
Considering the reservation in Continental Can, the condition might not 
apply in all cases and the assessment in Gillette/Wilkinson Sword 
strengthens this view. Thus, it is possible that some influence over the 
commercial policy could be sufficient without the need for virtual 
elimination of competition.  
 
Despite the limitations of article 102, the Commission used it regularly to 
control concentrations. The means of control was provided partly by a 
system of self-assessment, where experts analysed the levels of market 
power and concentrations in the common market and reported to the 
Competition Directorate.169 However, the Commission was also reliant on 
complaints by competitors or voluntary notification by a party wanting to 
guarantee the pursuance of a transaction with article 102 TFEU.170 The 
Commission’s formal legal powers to investigate transactions that may 
infringe articles 101 or 102 are very extensive. For article 337 TFEU 
provides that the Commission may collect any information or perform any 
checks required to fulfil its obligations.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
169 Cook and Kerse, p 4. 
170 Bos and others, p 113. 
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5. The Control System  
5.1 The Main Features of the Requirement 
for Mandatory Prior Notification  
 
The means for merger control at the Community level is provided by a 
system of prior notification according to article 4.1 EUMR. Since 2004, 
there have been from 274 to 402 notifications of concentrations to the 
Commission every year. None of the notified cases since 2004 has been 
excluded from control for being outside the scope of the EUMR, although a 
total of 52 notifications have been outside the scope since the first merger 
regulation entered into force in 1989. Until April 2014, the Commission has 
received 5504 notifications in total, of which 4888 of the transactions have 
been declared compatible with the common market (without need for 
commitments).171 Consequently, only about 9 per cent of all notified 
concentrations would significantly impede effective competition. 
 
All concentrations with a community dimension must be notified to the 
Commission, either by the acquirer of sole control or jointly by the acquirers 
of joint control or parties to a merger according to article 4.2 EUMR and 
article 2.1 ECIR. Such notification is mandatory and the concentration 
cannot be completed until the Commission has declared the concentration 
compatible with the common market, according to article 7 EUMR. Thus, 
article 7 stipulates a period of suspension, during which it is forbidden to 
implement the transaction that causes the concentration. Article 7 provides 
some exceptions and derogations from suspension for practical reasons. For 
example, an exception applies for public bids according to article 7.2. Since 
public bids may involve very many transactions with many concerned 
parties, it would be highly unpractical to require notification in case no 
shareholders would accept the bid and sell. Thus, a public bid may be 
launched and transactions may be completed before the Commission’s 
assessment as long as voting rights are not exercised in the meantime. 
Moreover, the Commission can order that shares must be divested that 
provide controlling influence and may significantly impede effective 
competition according to article 8.4 EUMR.172  
 
The procedure involving both notification and assessment may take up to 
several months depending on the complexity of the case.173 In some cases, 
the parties will be allowed several months just to provide the information 
                                                 
171 Merger Statistics; Also see [2.5] above about commitments as remedies for market 
compatibility.  
172 Cook and Kerse, p 166-167.  
173 Ibid, p 158.  
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required in the notification file.174 The notification must contain 
substantially detailed information about the parties and the transaction for 
the Commission’s assessment.175 It takes additional weeks or months for the 
Commission to provide its decision.176 The decision process can be divided 
into two phases of examination. Phase II is only initiated in cases where 
there are serious doubts as to the concentration’s compatibility with the 
common market according to article 6.1c EUMR. A phase II investigation 
may take up to 90 working days according to article 10.3, and even longer if 
some exceptions are applicable.177 The Phase I examination is generally 
restricted to 25 working days according to article 10.1, but may also be 
extended according article 10.2. Only about 5 per cent of all notified 
concentration cases require a phase II examination in practice.178 
 
In some cases, a short form notification can be submitted according to 
article 3.1 ECIR and its Annex 2. The short form notification is less 
demanding on the notifying party.179 The annex provides that short form 
notification can be submitted by acquisition of sole control from previous 
joint control, and also joint ventures of limited impact within the European 
Economic Area. Furthermore, a short form notification can be submitted for 
concentrations where the parties are not active in vertically nor horizontally 
related markets. Finally, concentrations can be notified in short form if the 
combined market share is less than 15 per cent and the parties are in 
horizontally related markets, or the market share is less than 25 per cent if 
the parties are in vertically related markets.  
 
It is possible to make pre-notification inquires to the Commission according 
to Recital 11 in the ECIR. This possibility is often used by prospective 
acquirers in transactions that fulfil the criterion for community dimension, 
but where it is uncertain whether the transaction causes a concentration. Pre-
notification inquires help the parties assess the likelihood of compulsory 
notification and the likelihood of declaration of incompatibility with the 
common market.180 A notification may be withdrawn at any time if a 
transaction is modified or aborted.181 It is possible that the prospect of 
notification makes the parties want to refrain from the concentration 
altogether because of the costs and time related to the notification 
procedure. Withdrawal may also be useful in some cases where a modified 
transaction may avoid a phase II examination, as was done in 
Procter&Gamble/VP Schickedanz for example.182 Finally, withdrawal is 
                                                 
174 For example in The Post Office/TPG/SPPL (Case COMP/M.1915) OJ L82, see para 1.  
175 See ECIR article 4 and annexes for details regarding the content requirements of a 
notification; also for further study see Cook and Kerse, p 147-154. 
176 See article 10 EUMR for timetable rules; Cook and Kerse 158. 
177 Whish, p 819. 
178 Cook and Kerse, p 187. 
179 Ibid, p 155. 
180 Ibid, p 318. 
181 Ibid, p 161-162. 
182 Procter&Gamble/VP Schickedanz (Case M.398 and M.430) [1994] OJ C19; and 
Procter&Gamble/VP Schickedanz (Case M.430) [1994] OJ L354. 
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often used in cases where prohibition seems likely during an ongoing phase 
II investigation, which may also explain the low number of prohibitions 
presented above.183 
 
 
 
5.2 Alternative Systems 
 
The Commission proposes three main options as to what system of control 
to apply for non-controlling minority shareholdings in case of reform. The 
first option is to stick to the notification system as it is currently regulated. 
Consequently, the first main option suggests that the current limits of 
application set by the definition of the concept concentration should be 
expanded to include structural links without any other changes.  
 
The second option suggests that the Commission itself should identify non-
controlling minority shareholdings to control (self-assessment system). As a 
result, the current notification system for concentrations would remain 
unchanged so there would be two separate systems providing means for 
control of concentrations and structural links respectively. The self-
assessment system relies on complaints by third parties and the 
Commission’s own ability to search for potentially problematic structural 
links. A significant difference between the notification system and self-
assessment system is that the transactions causing structural links would not 
be subject to control until after the transaction is completed under the self-
assessment system. As a result, it would be impossible to prevent structural 
links on beforehand under the self-assessment system. The self-assessment 
system can be compared to the system for control under articles 101 and 102 
TFEU as briefly discussed in [4.4]. 
 
The third reform option can be described as a hybrid between the other two 
(transparency system). It would be mandatory for the parties to notify the 
Commission of prima facie problematic transactions that are not 
concentrations but can cause structural links. The notifications would be 
published for the public. However, in contrast to the notification system the 
transactions would not be subject to merger control before completion. 
Moreover, the Commission would choose which of the notified transactions 
to investigate.184 For the self-assessment and transparency options, the 
Commission ponders on implementing a system of voluntary notification. 
The purpose of voluntary notification would be to allow parties to receive a 
clearance decision before the transaction is completed. Finally, it is 
suggested that voluntary notification should be possible regardless if the 
transactions has been completed or not.  
                                                 
183 Cook and Kerse, p 162. 
184 The Consultation Document, p 7-8. 
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5.3 Views by Consulted Organisations 
 
As is evident from the account in [5.1] above, the notification system is 
demanding in several aspects. In essence, the notification system requires 
that every transaction that is within the scope of EUMR is checked and 
cleared before implementation. There are requirements for the parties in 
transactions to afford time and effort by providing information and wait for 
the decision. Many of the consulted organisations believe that it would not 
be a good idea to use the current notification system in case of reform. The 
trend is that organisations that are critical of extending the scope to begin 
with, all favour the self-assessment system.185 For example, ECLF believes 
that the notification system would be too much of a burden for the business 
community and cause “detrimental impact on the effective and efficient 
operation of equity markets”.186 Similarly, Linklaters discusses that a 
notification system for structural links would be “clearly 
disproportionate”.187 OFT uses a similar reasoning for supporting the self-
assessment system instead of the current notification system, despite being 
generally positive to extending the scope of merger control to structural 
links.188 
 
IBA notes that a negative aspect with the self-assessment system is that a 
decision of incompatibility after implementation (ex-post control) is 
generally more problematic than ascertaining the compatibility of the 
transaction before (ex-ante control). This relates to the required efforts and 
possible costs for the acquirer to divest shares and uncertainty as to whether 
the transaction is compatible.189 To avoid legal uncertainty, the possibility 
of voluntary notification would be motivated.190 A voluntary notification 
would likely limit the number of scrutinised non-controlling minority 
shareholding acquisitions to the most problematic ones.191 Therefore, ECLF 
supports the self-assessment system. Since very few non-controlling 
minority shareholding acquisitions are likely to significantly impede 
effective competition, the voluntary notification would be proportionate.192  
 
Vinge and Mayer Brown do not believe that a possibility for voluntary 
control is preferred for the self-assessment option. Vinge believed that 
voluntary notification is against EU legal development, since such 
possibilities have been restricted under competition control under article 
                                                 
185 See Reply by ICC; Reply by ECLF; Reply by Vinge; Reply by Mayer Brown; and Reply 
by Linklaters.  
186 Reply by ECLF, p 4. 
187 Reply by Linklaters, p 8. 
188 Reply by OFT, p 3. 
189 Reply by IBA, p 4. 
190 Ibid. 
191 Reply by ECLF, p 5. 
192 Ibid.   
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101.193 One the other hand, Mayer Brown predicts that the possibility for 
voluntary notification might result in more caution in the business 
community resulting in “inefficient use of resources”.194  
 
ICC argues that ex-post control may actually not be problematic at all. Ex-
post control will provide incentives for the acquirer of a potentially 
problematic acquisition to contact the Commission, thereby allowing 
effective control in practice.195 Moreover, divesting incompatible non-
controlling minority shareholdings is less problematic than divesting 
controlling shareholdings. For “[non-controlling minority shareholdings do] 
not normally involve integration of the parties’ businesses”.196 
Bundeskartellamt rejects the ICC’s views, and instead refers to the problems 
concerning ex-post control in German legal practice to motivate that the 
current notification system should apply to non-controlling minority 
shareholding acquisitions as well.197 Bundeskartellamt also argues that the 
notification system is considerably more effective for merger control 
because of the substantial amount of information in the notification form.198 
 
The transparency system is not favoured in any of the studied consultation 
replies. ECLF provide a line of argument that highlights the problems with 
the hybrid option. The transparency system would make the Commission 
reliant on the limited information provided by the notifications. If less 
information was required, the system would probably be ineffective. If more 
information was required, the system would be too much of a burden for the 
business community for similar reasons as why the current notification 
system would be problematic.199 Moreover, Linklaters and Mayer Brown 
predict that the transparency system would not necessarily be less 
demanding than the notification system even if less information is required 
in the initial notification. The parties would likely need to submit more 
detailed information in many cases. Thereby, the less demanding 
implications of the transparency system would be deceptive.200 
                                                 
193 Reply by Vinge, p 2. 
194 Mayer Brown, p 3. 
195 Reply by ICC, p 8. 
196 Ibid. 
197 Reply by Bundeskartellamt, p 4. 
198 Ibid, p 5-6. 
199 Reply by ECLF, p 4. 
200 Reply by Linklaters, p 8-9; Reply by Mayer Brown, p 3. 
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6. Analysis 
6.1 The Need to Regulate Non-controlling 
Minority Shareholdings for Maintaining 
Effective Competition 
 
This final chapter presents my views with reference to the investigations 
presented above. The first three sections present analyses related to each of 
the three research questions. When all questions have been discussed, I 
make final conclusions as to whether an extended scope of merger control is 
motivated from the legal perspective.  
 
The meaning of non-controlling minority shareholding acquisitions as 
explored in chapter [2.2-4]. There is currently a threshold for the transfer of 
controlling influence over undertakings for merger control application. 
Control is defined as the ability to exercise decisive influence over strategic 
business decisions on a regular basis. Thus, non-controlling minority 
shareholdings are shareholdings that fail to provide control as defined under 
the EUMR. The condition for community dimension would not be an 
obstacle for applying merger control to non-controlling minority 
shareholdings. For the investigation has shown that the criteria concern the 
combined turnover thresholds of the concerned undertakings rather than the 
size of the transaction. On the other hand, the condition that a concentration 
needs to significantly impede effective competition for market 
incompatibility makes it necessary to consider the anti-competitive effects 
of non-controlling minority shareholdings. If the condition could never be 
achieved, then the extended scope would have no practical effect.  
 
The conditions in the SIEC test have been proved to be closely tied to the 
purposes of the EUMR and purposes of EU competition law as discussed in 
[2.5-6]. The requirement of significant impediment relates to the principle 
for proportionality in EU law as implied in the Recitals in EUMR. In other 
words, it would seem that only significant structural changes merit merger 
control at the community level. It is thus important to prove that non-
controlling minority shareholdings acquisitions are capable of such 
significant structural changes. The assessment depends on the extent that the 
acquisitions can harm effective competition. The examination of the 
meaning of the concept effective competition under the EUMR established a 
definition for what significant impediment of effective competition is: the 
creation of significant market power that harms consumer welfare and 
causes an overall negative effect for economic efficiency.  
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The effects of non-controlling minority shareholdings are explored in 
chapter [3]. I believe that the Commission’s economic investigation shows 
that non-controlling minority shareholdings may have numerous effects. 
First, a lack of decisive influence does not exclude the possibility of a lower 
level of influence over the target undertaking’s strategic business decisions. 
Second, there may be anti-competitive effects even if no influence is 
acquired. The investigation shows that any ownership in a competitor may 
cause unilateral effects. For the rights to profits from the competing 
undertaking decreases the incentives for an aggressive competition policy. 
Moreover, cross-shareholdings may increase the risks for coordinated 
effects, both in horizontal and vertical relationships. Now, does the 
economic investigation prove that non-controlling minority shareholdings 
can significantly impede effective competition? In my view it does not. 
Surely, it proves that there may be anticompetitive effects, but that does not 
prove that non-controlling minority shareholdings may significantly impede 
effective competition. I make this conclusion from the fact that the 
economic investigation does not present data that shows how the conditions 
in the SIEC test may be achieved by non-controlling minority 
shareholdings.  
 
However, the possibility for non-controlling minority shareholdings to 
significantly impede effective competition has been assessed in legal 
practice as discussed in [3.2]. The non-controlling shareholdings were only 
assessed in relation to notified concentrations though. The declaration of 
incompatibility would concern the acquisition of control and not the related 
non-controlling minority shareholdings. On the other hand, there are cases 
where the Commission required non-controlling minority shareholdings to 
be completely divested for the main transaction to be compatible. Three 
such cases were found: IPIC/MAN Ferrostaal, Siemens/VA Tech, and 
E.ON/MOL. In all these cases, no other commitments were required than the 
divestment of related non-controlling minority shareholding acquisitions (or 
corporate rights provided by the shareholding) for the main transaction to be 
cleared. In IPIC/MAN Ferrostaal it is clear that the possibility to influence 
the commercial policy of the target company was the decisive factor. I 
believe that these cases prove that non-controlling minority shareholdings 
are indeed capable of achieving the criteria in the SIEC test. Therefore, I 
believe that there is a gap in the law. 
 
However, what types of non-controlling minority shareholding acquisitions 
should be subject to merger control? In other words, what acquisitions 
should qualify as structural links for effective remedy? As mentioned in 
[2.1], one proposed option of qualifying structural links is to require a fixed 
percentage of the total shareholding. In all cases mentioned in the previous 
paragraph, the shareholdings constituted at least 25 per cent of the total 
shares. Consequently, the evidence does not support a lower threshold than 
25 per cent of the shares. Thresholds in Germany and the UK of 25 and 15 
per cent respectively means that a 25 per cent threshold would not be a 
completely unproven method of qualification for application.  
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The Commission also proposed another alternative for qualification. That 
option entails the use of method that is similar to the existing threshold for 
controlling influence. The required level of influence could simply be lower 
than decisive influence. The conclusions from IPIC/MAN Ferrostaal 
provides clear evidence that such an option could be considered. The 
investigation in [2.4] shows that the size of a shareholding may be 
irrelevant. For in current merger control, legal and practical circumstances 
may prove that even a very small minority shareholder may have controlling 
influence. Why could not a shareholding of less than 25 % in theory provide 
the same level of influence as the 30% shareholding that significantly 
impeded effective competition in IPIC/MAN Ferrostaal? After all, it was 
not the size of the shareholding but the level of influence that was decisive 
for the assessment that effective competition would be significantly 
impeded in IPIC/MAN Ferrostaal. Arguably, a 25 per cent threshold might 
thus not be sufficient. For sufficient remedy, legal reform should thus 
extend the scope of merger control to non-controlling minority shareholding 
acquisition that either include 25 per cent of the total shares or provide the 
same level of influence was sufficient in IPIC/MAN Ferrostaal. We might 
use the notion significant influence to refer to the undefined required level 
of influence after legal reform. That implies that a lower level of influence 
than decisive influence suffices for application. 
 
The conclusions above regarding how to qualify what non-controlling 
minority shareholdings for effective remedy can be challenged. First, the 
possibility for non-controlling minority shareholdings to significantly 
impede effective competition is proven with reference to only three cases. 
Thus, it is hardly possible to establish exactly what types of non-controlling 
minority shareholding acquisitions that would merit control. Moreover, the 
source authority of the cases are limited in that they only reflect the views of 
the Commission and not the CJEU.201 One may consider to use the models 
used in Germany and the UK as templates. However, the suitability of 
models from other jurisdiction requires that the substantive tests in the other 
jurisdictions can be compared to the SIEC test under the EUMR. Otherwise, 
it cannot be proven that the transactions that have been made subject to the 
EUMR by legal reform would be capable of significantly impeding effective 
competition. My comparative study in this thesis is not comprehensive 
enough to provide such evidence. Considering the lack of evidence, I 
believe that I cannot determine how reform should be implemented for 
effective remedy. 
 
Moving on, the statistics on the number of non-controlling minority that are 
assessed in Germany and the UK indicate the portion of all scrutinised 
transactions that are non-controlling acquisitions. The results presented in 
[3.4] prove that only a very small portion of all scrutinised transactions 
concern non-controlling minority shareholdings. Likewise, the statistics 
                                                 
201 See [1.3] regarding the authority of legal sources.  
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from the Zephyr database presented in [3.3] show that only about an 
additional 5 per cent of the total number of acquisitions that are currently 
within the scope of the EUMR would be subject to merger control after 
reform. Moreover, it is unlikely that all scrutinised non-controlling minority 
shareholding acquisitions would significantly impede effective competition. 
Statistics presented in [5.1] show that only about 9 per cent of all notified 
concentrations under the current EUMR would significantly impede 
effective competition. As mentioned in [3.1] the Commission’s economic 
investigation shows that non-controlling minority shareholding acquisitions 
generally cause less concerns for effective competition than controlling 
acquisitions. Consequently, I believe that it is likely that less than 9 per cent 
of all non-controlling minority shareholdings that would be subject to the 
EUMR after reform would significantly impede effective competition. In 
my view, the statistics prove that the gap in the law is probably very narrow. 
For if very few non-controlling minority shareholding acquisitions would be 
problematic in practice, there is less need for reform.  
 
 
 
6.2 Applicability of Current Law 
 
The discussed in [4.1], Ryanair/Aer Lingus illustrates how the EUMR is 
insufficient for regulating non-controlling minority shareholding 
acquisitions. The Commission does not have authority to asses such 
acquisitions unless they relate to a transaction that achieves the threshold for 
controlling influence. Nonetheless, it is proven that non-controlling minority 
shareholdings are not completely outside the scope of the EUMR.  
 
It is also proven that article 101 TFEU is applicable for non-controlling 
minority shareholdings under certain circumstances. The major limitation is 
that article 101 only applies to transaction agreements between independent 
undertakings. The legal investigation suggests that it would not be possible 
to apply article 101 in situations where a competing undertaking acquires 
shares in a competitor by third party shareholders. Consequently, I believe 
that article 101 could not be used in cases of hostile takeovers for example. 
In any case, the possibility to apply article 101 is clear from the Philip 
Morris judgement. Article 101 applies to non-controlling minority 
shareholdings that provide any ability to influence the commercial strategy 
of the target undertaking. In my view, article 101 could be thus be used to 
control some non-controlling minority shareholdings that are currently 
outside the scope of the EUMR. Therefore, article 101 narrows the gap in 
the law. 
 
Likewise, article 102 TFEU is applicable to non-controlling minority 
shareholdings in some instances as discussed in [4.4]. It is evident from 
Continental Can that a non-controlling minority shareholding acquisition by 
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a dominant undertaking in a competitor may infringe article 102. In 
similarity to the assessment under article 101, the infringement assessment 
depends on whether the acquisition provides the ability to influence the 
commercial policy of the target undertaking. The main issue with the 
application of article 102 is that the acquirer needs to be dominant before 
the transaction. Otherwise, the transaction does not constitute abusive 
behaviour by a dominant undertaking. In [4.4] it was discussed that there 
may be further limitations of application. However, I believe that the 
assessment in Gillette/Wilkinson Sword shows that the requirement of 
dominance and influence over the commercial policy are the only 
requirements. Apparently, article 102 may be used in some situations where 
article 101 could not be applied. Consequently, the possible uses of article 
102 further narrows the gap in the law.  
 
In [4.2] I present some background that could explain why the Commission 
does not use articles 101 or 102 TFEU. Adopting the first merger regulation 
was a result of legal uncertainty as to the application of articles 101 and 102. 
However, my legal investigation shows that there should be little doubt as to 
the application of articles 101 and 102 TFEU now that the EUMR is in 
place. Therefore, legal uncertainties surrounding the articles does not 
provide a credible argument for extending the scope of merger control in my 
view. 
 
 
 
6.3 Issues Related to the Control System 
 
The examination of the current ex-ante control system in [5.1] reveals how 
comprehensive the legal process is. The requirement to notify the 
Commission is demanding in that it requires a lot of effort for the notifying 
parties to provide information to the Commission. Moreover, the suspension 
rule requires the parties to refrain from implementing the transaction until it 
has been cleared by the commission. Bundeskartellamt was the only of the 
studied consulted organisation that supports that the notification system 
should apply for structural links. According to Bundeskartellamt, that 
system is the only system that ensures effective merger control.202 Arguably, 
the notification system should be retained to ensure that extending the scope 
of merger control structural links would effectively plug the gap in the law.  
 
However, the discussion in [5.3] presents concerns about the demanding 
features of the notification system. Most consulted organisation believe that 
such a system would have significant negative effects on businesses. For 
example, the notification system would be costly and adversely affect 
economic growth. One may question if effective merger control is more 
                                                 
202 See [5.3]. 
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important than economic growth. From my investigation in [2.6] about the 
purpose to maintain effective competition, it is evident that overall effect on 
economic efficiency is decisive in EU merger control.  
 
The self-assessment system is supported by most consulted organisations. 
For the self-assessment system imposes no obligation to submit a 
notification, nor would it be necessary to wait for clearance by the 
Commission to implement the transaction. Thus, the self-assessment system 
could have less negative effects for the business community. On the other 
hand, ex-post control may also be problematic in that it could be 
complicated and costly to divest already implemented shareholdings. 
Moreover, there could be legal uncertainty as to the legality of the 
transactions which would have negative effects as to the incentives to 
invest. The possibility of voluntary notification could provide greater legal 
certainty though. In my opinion, the self-assessment system could perhaps 
be motivated if it can be proved that it allows effective merger control. For 
it is important that any reform would remedy the gap in the law. 
Unfortunately, I have not found sufficient legal evidence that motivates any 
system considering the lacking source authority of the consulted 
organisations.  
 
Concerns regarding negative aspects with merger control process systems 
could perhaps discourage reform. It comes down to assessing if the need for 
reform is so great that it would be proportionate despite the negative aspects 
of legal process.  
 
 
 
6.4 Final Evaluation 
 
In conclusion, the investigations in this thesis confirm that there is a gap in 
the law. However, the gap is very narrow. One of the reasons is that articles 
101 and 102 are applicable for some non-controlling minority shareholding 
acquisitions. In addition, it is likely that only very few non-controlling 
minority shareholdings would merit scrutiny under a reformed EUMR. The 
reason is that the statistical and comparative studies suggest that the amount 
of non-controlling minority shareholding acquisitions between competitors 
is small. In addition, it is likely that only a very small portion of all 
structural links would significantly impede effective competition. 
 
The limited material makes it impossible to determine exactly how to define 
structural links for effective remedy. Evidence in legal practice shows that 
non-controlling minority shareholdings constituting more than 25 per cent 
of the shares, or providing material influence could significantly impede 
effective competition. However, the evidence is very limited and it is 
unclear as how to formulate the conditions for significant influence.  
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The current system of mandatory prior notification would most likely be the 
most effective control system. All cases within the scope of merger control 
would be scrutinised by the Commission and the notification would provide 
useful data for assessment.  It can neither be proved nor excluded that a self-
assessment system could be effective, although the possibility for voluntary 
notification might increase effectiveness and decrease legal uncertainty. 
There is a lack of authoritative sources on the uses of alternative control 
systems for controlling non-controlling minority shareholdings in the EU. 
However, the study illustrates issues that control systems may cause on 
businesses, such as the costs and effort to provide materials for the 
Commission’s assessment and decreased incentives to invest. The self-
assessment may cause less such negative effects on businesses. 
 
Since it is likely that only a small number of structural links would 
significantly impede effective competition, there is less need for legal 
reform. Moreover, the investigation in this thesis cannot prove exactly how 
the reform should be implemented for effective remedy, considering limited 
evidence for what acquisitions should qualify as structural links. Concerns 
as to negative aspects of the merger control process systems makes it 
necessary to consider the proportionality of reform. I have not been able to 
find sufficient evidence to support that legal reform would be effective and 
proportional. Therefore, I do not believe that reform can be encouraged 
from the legal perspective. On the other hand, my thesis does not prove that 
reform is discouraged neither. Further studies are required as to the amount 
of non-controlling minority shareholdings that would significantly impede 
effective competition, how reform could be effectively implemented and the 
magnitude of the negative effects on the business community from the 
chosen merger control process system. 
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